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Abstract 
A key challenge of the present is the growing number of consumer debtors, often caused by easy 
access to credit. Especially for people on low incomes, even an unforeseen event can lead to a 
situation in which credit rates can no longer be serviced. The result is insolvency. However, in the 
past many jurisdictions were not prepared for the challenges of low income insolvency. It was not 
until more recent times that legislators began to develop special insolvency procedures tailored to 
people with low incomes.  
This comparative research presents the insolvency proceedings of South Africa, in particular the 
recently introduced low income insolvency proceedings, and compares them with those of New 
Zealand, Great Britain and Germany, whereby Germany is the only one of these countries without a 
low-income insolvency procedure. It is established that each of these proceedings has advantages 
and disadvantages. It is also noted that despite the existence of insolvency proceedings, the number 
of consumer debtors continues to rise. Therefore, in addition to a proposal for insolvency 
proceedings combining the feasible aspects of each of the legal systems presented, it is also 
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Chapter One Introduction 
I. Problem Outline 
Although consumer credit law is highly influenced by economic, social and political considerations, 
there is a certain similarity between the legislations of different countries in this area. Therefore, 
consumer credit law offers a broad and interesting basis for comparison.1 Historically, consumer 
protection did not feature prominently in legislation. In fact, in most jurisdictions there were either 
no provisions on consumer insolvencies in force or existing provisions focused mainly on the 
creditors' best interests.2 However, the situation gradually changed and a noticeable increase in 
consumer credit occurred.3 The reason for this was that the first credit card providers emerged, 
making credit available to consumers worldwide.4 The availability of (unsecured) credit soon 
extended to groups of society that previously had no access to loans due to a lack of securities.5 
Some reasons for this change are the deregulation of consumer lending, originating from the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision to lift state interest rate restrictions on credit cards to increase their 
profitability, technologies for assessing credit worthiness, and the advertising of credit cards by 
banks.6 Access to credit has opened up new opportunities for consumers, more specifically access to 
consumer goods that they previously could not afford.7 The downside, however, is that even a small 
unforeseen event can lead to the consumer no longer being able to service her credit and becoming 
indebted.8 The result is the growing over-indebtedness of consumers, characterised by the fact that 
the debt burden exceeds the ability to meet repayment obligations.9  
 A common cause for changes in the law is that current legislation no longer meets the needs 
of society. The influence of social change on legislation was noticeable, for example, in Germany, 
where the number of indebted consumers increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s.10 More 
precisely, total consumer debt in Germany more than doubled between 1984 and 1994 from around 
                                               
1 Jannie Otto, The History of the Consumer Credit Legislation in South Africa, Unisa Press (2010) 257 at 259. 
2 Assaf Lichtash, Realigning the American Consumer Bankruptcy System with the Goals of the Fresh-Start Doctrine: A 
Global Comparative Analysis, 34 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev 169 (2011); Keeper op cit note x at 83-84; Johanna 
Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Ian Ramsey, William Whitford (eds.), Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective (2003) Hart 
Publishing, Oregon at 1 (hereafter Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al Bankruptcy). 
3 Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al op cit note 2 at 2. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Adrian Walters, Individual Voluntary Arrangements: ‘Fresh Start’ for Salaried Consumer Debtors in England and 
Wales? Int. Insolv. Rev. Vol.18: 5-36 (2009) at 4. 
6 Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v First of Omaha Service Corporation 439 US 299 (1978); Niemi-
Kiesiläinen et al Bankruptcy op cit note 2 at 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid at 4. 
9 Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Ann-Sofie Henrikson, ‘Legal Solutions to Debt Problems in Credit Societies – A Report 
to the Council of Europe’ (Umea University, 2005) 7.  
10 Jason J. Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolutionary Changes in German 





160 billion Deutsche Mark11 in 1984 to almost DM 364 billion in 1994.12 However, German 
insolvency law did not contain specific rules for consumer insolvencies. As a result, German 
insolvency law was unable to meet the challenges of rising consumer debt. The increasing number 
of consumer debtors led to the need for consumer protection provisions.13 It followed that the 
German insolvency law had to be adapted and the result was the new Insolvency Act of 1999. 
Current figures also show that the number of loans continues to rise: around 8 million new credit 
agreements were concluded in 2017.14 This represents an increase of around 4.45 percent compared 
to the previous year. The number of private insolvencies in 2017 amounted to 94,079.15 
 Yet, Germany is by no means the only country with an increasing number of consumer 
debtors. Rather, a global transformation can be observed. A similar development can be noted in 
South Africa. The Usury Act was passed before microcredits, credit cards and access bonds on 
home loans were introduced. Moreover, this law was complicated and incomprehensible. These 
factors contributed to the Usury Act becoming outdated.16 In addition, in 1992 the first Exemption 
Notice was issued, which exempted loans below R6 000 from the interest rate restrictions of Section 
15A of the Usury Act. This exemption opened up the possibility for credit providers to charge an 
unlimited interest rate on small loans and thereby led to the establishment of a largely unregulated 
microcredit industry.17 Thus a credit market was created for people on low incomes who could not 
provide any other assets as security and thus had no access to the official credit market.18 Consumer 
debt became increasingly out of control given the fact that creditors were demanding interest rates 
of up to 30 percent, but also had no access to the National Payment System and therefore used other 
methods to obtain their money.19 The usual method to secure the repayment of these loans was to 
take possession of the bank card with the corresponding private identification number and then 
                                               
11 German currency between 1948 and 1999, abbreviated as DM or D-Mark; in 1999 the Euro was introduced in 
Germany. 
12 Ibid at 261. 
13 Kilborn op cit note 9 at 262. 
14 For the statistics see https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/70156/umfrage/abgeschlossene--kreditvertraege-in-
deutschland/ (last accessed on 27 November 2019). 
15 For the statistics see https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/37122/umfrage/anzahl-der-insolvenzen-in-
deutschland-insgesamt/ (last accessed on 27 November 2019). 
16 Michelle Kelly-Louw, The Prevention and Alleviation of Consumer Over-Indebtedness SA Mercantile Law Journal, 
Volume 20, Issue 2, Jan (2008) at 201 (hereafter Kelly-Louw Prevention). 
17 Ibid at 202. 
18Michelle Kelly-Louw, Consumer Credit Regulation in South Africa, (2012) Juta, Cape Town at 290 (hereafter Kelly-






withdraw money monthly. The consumer sometimes received a small amount to cover her living 
expenses, but often received no money at all.20  
 There are many conflicting interests in consumer credit law. On the one hand, credit 
providers have an interest in profit, but on the other hand it is necessary to protect the consumer as 
the weaker party.21 Moreover, credit is an essential factor for the functioning of society as they play 
an important role especially in business but also for households.22 The importance of credits can be 
seen in the example of South Africa, where in 2017 the total value of newly granted loans increased 
from R123.64 billion to R135.71 billion, and thus by 9.76 percent, between September and 
December. In addition, outstanding consumer credit at the end of December 2017 was R1.76 
trillion, an increase of 1.53 percent quarter-on-quarter and 3.77 percent year-on-year.23  
 South Africa's economy is divided into two sectors: the formal sector with a skilled labour 
force and the informal sector, where the unemployed and those who are not employable in the 
formal sector work. In order to obtain credit, those in the informal sector are largely dependent on 
the so-called unregulated credit industry. The beginnings of unregulated micro-lending can be 
traced back to the enactment of the Usury Act, which aimed to protect debtors from excessive 
interest rates.24 In fact, however, it led to people on low incomes being excluded from access to 
credit as they became too high a risk for credit providers due to a lack of securities and were not 
profitable due to capped interest rates introduced by the Usury Act.25 To counter this problem the 
legislator issued the first Exemption Notice which introduced an exception to the capped interest 
rates for loans under R6 000 (later changed to R10 000 in the second Exemption Notice).26 This 
exemption was designed to enable people on low incomes to obtain loans by reducing the risk of 
credit providers with uncapped interest rates.27 As a result, the basis was laid for the growth of an 
unregulated micro lending industry.28 However, the Exemption Notice failed to establish rules for 
credit providers' behaviour, which allowed them to exploit debtors.29 For example, debtors' credit 
cards were confiscated and they were forced to disclose their PIN so that the credit providers were 
                                               
20 Kelly-Louw Prevention op cit note 16 at 202. 
21 Otto op cit note 1 at 259. 
22 Kelly-Louw Regulation op cit note 18 at 290. 
23 Consumer Credit Market Report, National Credit Regulator (Available at https://nca.co.za/consumer-credit-health-
improves/#more-1160 (last accessed on 02 December 2019). 
24 Kelly-Louw Regulation  op cit note 18 at  7-8. 
25 Ibid at 8. 








able to withdraw the monthly payments with interest directly from the debtors' accounts.30 
Furthermore, the Exemption Notices did not provide for a limit on the number of loans a credit 
provider could issue to the same debtor. As a result, it was possible for credit providers to give a 
debtor multiple loans for R10 000 or less and thus avoid the capped interest rates.31 This practice 
allowed micro-lenders to take advantage of the desperate situation of low-income debtors and force 
them into serious debt through excessive interest rates.32  
 A crucial problem in South Africa was that a distinction was made between debtors with 
assets and those without income and own assets. While wealthy debtors were eligible for 
sequestration under the Insolvency Act, non-wealthy debtors had no access to statutory debt relief 
measures.33 Instead, these debtors only had access to measures under the National Credit Act34 or 
the Magistrate's Courts Act35. However, these procedures are rather to be classified as repayment 
plans as there is no possibility for debt relief and the debt must be repaid in full.36 The last option 
for such debtors was instead to enter into voluntary negotiations with the creditors to agree a debt 
rescheduling.37 However, these negotiations were often doomed to failure as the creditors rarely co-
operated due to the lack of assets.38 To put an end to the unequal treatment of wealthy and low-
income debtors in South Africa, the legislator published the National Credit Amendment Bill in 
2017, which has been in force since August 2019. This National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 2019 
aims at reducing reckless lending and enabling people on low income to obtain debt relief.39 
However, this law does not receive universal approval. Rather, it is argued that it is an 
unconstitutional confiscation of property and that it will have an unpredictable impact on the South 
African economy.40 
                                               
30 Kelly-Louw Prevention op cit note 16 at 201-202. 
31 Kelly-Louw Regulation op cit note 18 at 10. 
32 Pamhidzai Bamu, Joachim Schukmann, Shane Godfrey, The National Credit Act: will it increase access to credit for 
small and micro enterprises? Law, Democracy & Development Vol 11, 33 (January 2007) 38. 
33 Melanie Roestoff, Hermie Coetzee, Consumer Debt Relief in South Africa; Lessons from America and England; and 
Suggestions for the Way Forward, 24 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J. 53 (2012) at 59. 
34 Debt review in terms of Section 86. 
35 Administration order in terms of Section 74. 
36 Hermie Coetzee, An Opportunity for No Income No Asset (NINA) Debtors to Get out of Check - An Evaluation of the 
Proposed Debt Intervention Measure, 81 THRHR 593(2018) 596. 
37 Hermie Coetzee and Melanie Roestoff, Consumer Debt Relief in South Africa— Should the Insolvency System 
Provide for NINA Debtors? Lessons from New Zealand, Int. Insolv. Rev., Vol. 22: 188 (2013) at 189. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Preamble National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 2019. 
40 Association of Debt Recovery Agents, Written Submissions Pursuant to Publication of the National Credit 
Amendment Bill of 2018 in Parliamentary Notice 922 Published on 24 November 2017 in Government Gazette  529, No 
41274 at 15; https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/267443/new-debt-relief-bill-will-make-it-harder-to-get-a-loan-in-





 In January 2017, consumer credit in New Zealand had reached 248,163 million New 
Zealand Dollars (hereafter NZD), an increase of 0.52 percent from NZD 246.877 million in 
December 2016.41 In a period beginning in 1990 with a record low of NZD 21.498 million in 
December 1990 to January 2017 with a historic peak of NZD 248.163 million, consumer credit 
increased by 1154 percent.42 Following the Ministry of Economic Developments findings that 
consumer credit agreements had become the main reason for insolvency, the New Zealand 
Government introduced the No Asset Procedure (hereafter NAP) into New Zealand law, thereby 
reacting to the rising number of consumer insolvencies.43  
 Great Britain is also facing growing consumer indebtedness. In September 2019, the average 
debt per household in the United Kingdom amounted to £59,823, thus stagnating since December 
2008 when it stood at around £59,630 per household, although a new insolvency procedure was 
introduced in 2009.44 However, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecast, this 
figure is expected to rise in the following years to a total debt of £2.425 trillion and thus to £86,388 
on average per household. 
 These figures indicate that the growing indebtedness of consumers is a critical problem and 
that legislation needs to address these social changes. At the same time, however, it raises the 
question of the extent to which legislation can actually remedy the situation. 
 
II. Research Question  
In the light of the above-mentioned problem-outline the research question is what alterations the 
National Credit Amendment Act brings, how it might influence the South African economy and 
how the insolvency proceedings are regulated in Great Britain, New Zealand and Germany. 
 
III. Aim of the Research 
This research focuses on the consumer insolvency law in South Africa within the context of its 
history and recent changes. Furthermore, the research describes and makes comparison between the 
consumer credit legislations in Germany, Great Britain and New Zealand. The aim of this research 
is to point out how the legislation of these countries developed, what economic influences it was 
                                               
41 https://tradingeconomics.com/new-zealand/consumer-credit (last accessed 12 November 2019). 
42 Ibid. 
43 New Zealand, Ministry of Economic Development, Insolvency Law Review: Tier One Discussion Documents 
(Wellington, 2001) 30. 
44  https://themoneycharity.org.uk/money-statistics/; https://themoneycharity.org.uk/media/december-2008.pdf (last 





subject to, and to what extent these legal systems are similar. The aim is also to determine if and to 
what extent these legal systems serve as examples for each other and what conclusions can be 
drawn for economic development of one country for another. However, this influence is not one-
sided rather, this research aims to show that legislation and social, economic and political influences 
affect each other. This is reflected in the fact that legislation needs to be adapted to social, political 
and economic change, in other words to the continuously changing needs of society. On the other 
hand, the enactment of a law can also influence the economy as can be seen in the rise of the 
unregulated micro credit industry in South Africa which was a consequence of the enactment of the 
Usury Act and which will be explained in detail below.  
IV. The Structure of this Research  
This study is structured into seven chapters. Chapter one outlines the background to the latest 
legislative amendment in South African insolvency law. It also gives an overview of the 
relationship between social changes in the area of over-indebtedness and changes in insolvency law 
in Great Britain, New Zealand and Germany. In Chapter two and three the different procedures of 
British law and New Zealand insolvency law will be appraised. Chapter four then examines the 
German Insolvency procedure. Chapter five deals with the previous legislation regarding insolvency 
law in South Africa and then outlines the changes the new National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 
2019 brought. In Chapter six compares the different legal systems, highlighting their differences 
and similarities. Chapter seven concludes the research suggesting how the different approaches 
might learn and benefit from each other. 






Chapter Two British Consumer Insolvency Law  
I. Introduction 
Consumer credit law is often perceived as a modern phenomenon, but on the contrary has historical 
roots that can be traced back to ancient peoples such as the Romans.45 At that time there were 
already regulations for consumer protection and some of these regulations have survived into 
modern times, like for example the ultra duplum rule, which is still in force today in South Africa.46 
Another source for South African law apart from Roman and Roman-Dutch law is English law.47 
However, South Africa is not the only legal system inspired by English law. Rather, English law 
also had a significant impact on consumer protection within the European Union. More precisely, 
the Consumer Credit Act 39 of 1974 which is based on the Report of the Crowther Commission in 
197148 served, as a model for the European Economic Community Directive on Consumer Credit49 
from 1986 (hereafter Directive).50  This Directive lays down the minimum standards of consumer 
protection to be implemented by the Member States in their national law in its Article 14. These 
minimum requirements form the basis of a uniform level of consumer protection in the European 
Union, yet the Directive does not prevent Member States from adopting stricter provisions to 
protect consumers,51 which is the case for example in Germany, where inter alia the founder of a 
new business enjoys consumer protection.52 
 This chapter gives a brief overview of British consumer insolvency law, with the term 
‘British’ for this purpose covering only the legal systems in England and Wales, as Scotland has 
retained its own legal system albeit being part of the United Kingdom.53 This overview consists of a 
breakdown of the various insolvency mechanisms such as Bankruptcy, Individual Voluntary 
Agreement, County Court Administration Order and Debt Management Arrangement.  
 
                                               
45 Otto op cit note 1 at 257. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Great Britain. Committee on Consumer Credit & Sir Geoffrey Crowther, Consumer credit: report of the Committee 
on Consumer Credit, H.M.S.O, Lond 1907- 1971 (Cmnd 4596). 
49 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 or the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, amended by Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 
1990. 
50 Otto op cit note 1 at 265. 
51 Directive, Art. 15. 
52 German Civil Code, Section 513; see also Philipp Wösthoff, Die Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie 2008/48/EG und deren 
Umsetzung ins deutsche Recht, (2010) Peter Lang, Berlin at 138.  
53 Donna McKenzie Skene, Adrian Walters, Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great Britain, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 





II. History of British Consumer Insolvency Law  
In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere in the world, economic, political and social developments led 
to a reform of insolvency law that focused on consumer insolvency. Stable economic conditions, 
increasing credit availability and rising house prices led to a rising number of indebted households 
and made consumer insolvency a central political concern in the United Kingdom.54 This concern 
was usually addressed at two levels: on the one hand, it was sought to develop strategies to prevent 
consumer over-indebtedness.55 These included measures to promote responsible lending, debt 
advice and financial education.56 On the other hand, a legislative reform restructured bankruptcy 
law in such a way as to support and relieve over-indebted consumers.57 The Insolvency Act 1986 
experienced two important changes. The first was the amendment of the Enterprise Act 2002 to the 
Insolvency Act in that the period for discharge was reduced from three years to 12 months, several 
restrictions, disqualifications and prohibitions have been revoked and also a sharper distinction 
between culpable and non-culpable bankruptcies was enforced.58 The second amendment was 
brought about by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and included the introduction of 
the Debt Relief Order (hereafter DRO) designed to provide relief to debtors with little or no 
income.59 
 
III. The Different Procedures in British Consumer Insolvency Law  
(a) The Bankruptcy Procedure  
The term bankruptcy in English insolvency law is understood as a final remedy with strict 
consequences for the debtor.60 On the other hand, English insolvency law is also strongly influenced 
by the idea of a fresh start for the debtor.61 In other words, in the event of bankruptcy, the debtor is 
granted debt relief. In England and Wales bankruptcy is governed by Part IX of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (hereafter Insolvency Act). The procedure begins with an application by the debtor or a 
creditor to the court.62 The debtor must submit a statement of affairs to the court, stating that she is 
not able to pay off her debts.63 According to Section 286 of the Insolvency Act ‘the debtor appears 
to be unable to pay a debt if, but only if, the debt is payable immediately and either (a) the 
                                               
54 Ibid at 477. 
55 Ibid at 478. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Walters op cit note 4 at 15. 
59 Roestoff/Coetzee op cit note 33 at 73. 
60 Ian F. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 3rd ed (2002) Sweet and Maxwell, London, 37 para 3-002. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Insolvency Act, Sections 264(1) and 373. 





petitioning creditor to whom the debt is owed has served on the debtor a demand (known as "the 
statutory demand") in the prescribed form requiring him to pay the debtor to secure or compound 
for it to the satisfaction of the creditor, at least three weeks have elapsed since the demand was 
served and the demand has been neither complied with nor set aside in accordance with the rules, or 
(b) execution or other process issued in respect of the debt on a judgment or order of any court in 
favour of the petitioning creditor, or one or more of the petitioning creditors to whom the debt is 
owed, has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part’. Furthermore, the administrative costs of 
£250 and the court costs of £370 must be paid.64 Where the court sees a possibility for the debtor to 
enter into an Individual Voluntary Agreement with her creditors, the court shall appoint an 
insolvency practitioner to assist the debtor with its implementation.65 This applies mainly in cases 
where the debtors’ debts don’t exceed the amount of £20,00066, the value of her assets amounts to at 
least £2,000, and the debtor has not been adjudged bankrupt or entered into a composition or 
scheme of affairs with creditors during the past five years. The bankruptcy is managed at least 
temporarily by the so-called Official Receiver (hereafter OR).67 This is a state official employed by 
the Insolvency Service, which itself is an executive agency of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.68 
From the time of her appointment, the assets of the bankrupt vest in the trustee.69 The trustee is 
endowed with extensive powers allowing her to perform her role of distributing the assets among 
the creditors effectively.70 She can, for example, reverse transactions that the bankrupt has made 
before her adjudication.71 The money obtained by the trustee through the realisation of the debtor's 
assets is distributed proportionally among those creditors who hold a provable claim against the 
debtor.72 The debtor must surrender her non-exempt estate but may keep books, vehicles and tools 
needed to carry out her profession, as well as clothing, furniture and equipment necessary to meet 
the basic needs of the debtor and her family.73 Furthermore the debtor has to make payments to the 
creditors from her income in cases where the income exceeds the exempted amount.74 As long as 
the debtor is subject to summary administration and the discharge has not yet taken place, she is 
                                               
64 Iain Ramsay, Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England and Wales - the Neo-Liberal Cuckoo in the European 
Bankruptcy Nest? 205 in Johanna Niemi-Kisläinen, Iain Ramsay, William Whitford (eds), CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003) Hart Publishing, Oregon at 208-209. 
65 Insolvency Act, Section 273(2)(b). 
66 See Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 No 1996. 
67 Insolvency Act, Section 287(1). 
68 Donna McKenzie Skene, Adrian Walters, Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Scotland England and Wales, (the 
article is based on a paper given at the INSOL Academics’ Group Meeting held at Scottsdale, Arizona, May 2006) at 7.  




73 Insolvency Act, Section 283(2). 





subject to some restrictions.75  She may not borrow more than £250 without disclosing her 
insolvency and may not hold office as a Member of Parliament or a local authority.76 Discharge 
typically takes place two years after the commencement of the bankruptcy if a summary 
administration certificate was issued or three years in all other cases.77 As an effect of the discharge, 
the insolvent is released from her debts. In other words, the debtor is granted a discharge.78 
Effectively, the creditors cannot obtain any outstanding balance from the debtor through individual 
enforcement.79 A debtor who filed for bankruptcy for the first time is automatically discharged two 
to three years after the beginning of the bankruptcy proceedings.80 
However, there are also debts that cannot be subject to discharge. Those include criminal penalties, 
student loans, debts obtained through fraud or fraudulent breach of trust, certain categories of 
damages and debts resulting from a court order in family proceedings.81 Furthermore, the rights of 
secured creditors will not be affected by the discharge.82  
 In cases where the debts owed to the creditors don’t exceed the small bankruptcy level  of 
£20,00083 and the debtor has not been adjudged bankrupt in the past five years the bankruptcy is 
processed in the so-called summary administration.84 In principle, summary administration is a 
simplified procedure as it is carried out without a creditors' meeting, the OR acts as trustee of the 
assets, and contrary to Section 289(1) of the Insolvency Act she has no obligation to investigate the 
circumstances that led to the insolvency. Discharge thereafter takes place following two instead of 
three years.85 
 
(b) The Individual Voluntary Agreement 
An Individual Voluntary Agreement (hereafter IVA) is a binding composition between a debtor and 
her creditors, which is based on a proposal by the debtor to the creditors.86 Within the framework of 
an IVA, the sale of property or income repayments may be agreed upon.87 In addition, the debtor is 
assigned an insolvency practitioner (hereafter IP) as nominee and supervisor for the agreement.88 
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The nominee submits a report to the court informing the court whether a creditors' meeting should 
be held to consider the proposal.89 To approve the proposal, a majority of more than 75 percent of 
the value of the unsecured creditors present is required.90 A creditor in the vote may also be 
represented by a proxy.91 Furthermore the proposal is binding for both the concurring and the 
dissenting creditors. 92  However, the rights of secured or preferential creditors cannot be 
compromised without their consent.93 Although the vast majority of IVAs are concluded prior to 
bankruptcy, a debtor who is subject to bankruptcy may agree on an IVA with her creditors prior to 
discharge in order to cancel the bankruptcy.94 Once the proposal is put in place through the 
creditors' vote, the nominee is to supervise the debtor's compliance with its terms.95 The terms of 
the IVA depend on the debtor's proposal and whether it is accepted unconditionally by the creditors 
since the latter have the right to request adjustments to the proposal.96 Upon fulfilment of the 
conditions of the IVA, a discharge follows. Thus, the IVA offers debt relief to the debtor.97 If the 
conditions of the IVA are to be changed due to changes in the debtor's living conditions, for 
example, the unanimous consent of the creditors is generally required.98 However, there is usually a 
provision in the proposal that changes require approval by the majority of creditors.99 Expenses of 
the IP for the work as nominee and supervisor will be covered from the arrangement proceeds.100 
Usually, court fees or deposits do not have to be paid in advance.101  
IVAs account for about 20-25 percent of all insolvency proceedings, although this procedure was 
not originally developed for consumer insolvency and is not affordable for all consumers given the 
average cost of £1500 for the nominee and £2500 for the supervisor.102  
 
(c) County Court Administration Order 
A County Court Administration Order (hereafter CCAO) is an, albeit limited, way of dealing with 
over-indebtedness outside the bankruptcy system and is known throughout its existence as the ‘poor 
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persons bankruptcy’.103 The CCAO is dealt with in the County Courts Act 1984 (hereafter CCA). 
Its original purpose was to facilitate the collection of small loans where bankruptcy proceedings 
would be too expensive and, at the same time, to protect the debtor against being harassed by her 
creditors.104 The CCAO is initiated by an application to the county court.105 The conditions for a 
CCAO are that the applicant's debt is below the £5,000 threshold and part of it is from a 
judgment.106 The order issued by the court may include full or partial repayment of the debt.107 In 
addition, the court has no limitation on the granting of a period for the repayment.108 Each of the 
creditors mentioned in the order is prevented from taking legal action against the debtor for the 
entire duration of the order.109 Furthermore, the CCAO is not subject to an entry fee, the costs of 
enforcing the order will be deducted from the repayments and may not exceed 10 percent of the 
total amount of the debt.110 
 
(d) Debt Relief Order 
On 6 April 2009 the Debt Relief Order (hereafter DRO) was introduced into the Insolvency Act 
1986. The procedure is regulated in Sections 251A-251X of the Insolvency Act and enables people 
who cannot afford the costs of bankruptcy proceedings due to low or no income or assets to obtain 
debt relief.111 In order to apply for a DRO, the debtor must be unable to pay her debts.112 It is 
important to note that an application for a DRO can only be made in respect of qualifying debts.113 
This is any unsecured debt which is ‘a liquidated sum payable either immediately or at some certain 
future time; and is not an excluded debt’.114 The DRO is a procedure that is carried out by the OR 
without any court proceedings. To start the DRO an application for debt relief must be submitted to 
the OR. Furthermore, the applicant must meet certain requirements.115 Firstly, the applicant’s 
liabilities may not exceed the amount of £15,000.116 Secondly, the amount that the debtor has left 
after paying normal household expenses may not exceed £50 per month.117 Finally, the debtor's 
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assets may not exceed £300 and a vehicle owned by the debtor must not exceed a value of £1000.118 
Once the order has been issued, a moratorium is imposed prohibiting creditors from enforcing the 
debts covered by the order.119 According to Section 251K of the Insolvency Act, the creditors have 
the possibility to object to ‘the making of the order, the inclusion of the debt in the list of the 
debtor's qualifying debts; or the details of the debt specified in the order’.120 The debtor has various 
obligations set out in Section 251J of the Insolvency Act while the moratorium is in force. One of 
them is to inform the OR of any change in her circumstances that concerns an increase in her 
income or the acquisition of property.121 The debtor is also faced with restrictions similar to those 
applicable in bankruptcy.122 This includes for example that the debtor must give a credit provider 
the relevant information about her status before obtaining credit.123 The moratorium is generally 
valid for one year.124 Upon termination of the moratorium, the debtor is granted a discharge.125 An 
application for a DRO is possible every six years.126 
 
(e) Debt Management Arrangement 
Another alternative, but independent of the bankruptcy system, is the Debt Management 
Arrangement (hereafter DMA). Generally, the DMA is negotiated by the debtor herself after 
visiting a debt counselling service.127 However, the condition for a DMA is that the debtor has a 
regular surplus in her income.128 The aim of the DMA is a full repayment over a certain period or a 
repayment on DMA terms, bridging the gap until the debtor has sufficient capacity again for the 
originally agreed repayments.129 To achieve this, the debt is rescheduled and the monthly payment 
is distributed to the creditors.130 The advantage of the DMA is that no assets have to be surrendered, 
which is why this procedure is a frequently used alternative, especially for homeowners.131 
However, there are also several disadvantages: DMAs are neither binding nor individual 
enforcement efforts. 132  Furthermore, the interest continues to add up to the amount of the 
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outstanding principal debt, unless the creditors waive it.133 A further disadvantage is the duration of 
such a procedure which can drag on over a long period.134 
 
IV. Summary of the British Insolvency Law system 
In the event of insolvency, England and Wales have a total of five different procedures, four of 
which are formal procedures. These five procedures are Bankruptcy, IVA, County Court 
Administration Order, Debt Relief Order and Debt Management Arrangement. The Bankruptcy 
procedure is based on the idea of giving an honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start. It seeks to 
relieve the debtor of her debts by discharging her debts after a certain period. However, bankruptcy 
is not suitable for every debtor, since the costs of the procedure must be paid out of the insolvent 
estate. This means the debtor needs enough assets to cover the costs for the insolvency proceedings. 
It is worth mentioning that there is a possibility of a less cost-intensive summary administration 
within the bankruptcy procedure for small bankruptcies, which at least broadens the scope of 
debtors who can enjoy the advantages inherent to the bankruptcy procedure. Instead of entering into 
bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor has the possibility to negotiate an IVA with her creditors. The 
advantage of this procedure is, that bankruptcy itself and the restrictions, which the debtor has to 
face during bankruptcy proceedings can be avoided. Furthermore, it is binding even on dissenting 
creditors if the required quorum is met. Admittedly, this procedure can only be considered for 
debtors with assets, since the consent of a creditor majority is required in order for the IVA to come 
into force and they would not agree to a disadvantageous arrangement. Before the DRO was 
introduced in 2009 low income debtors could only apply for a CCAO or a DMA but neither of these 
procedures provides for debt discharge, therefore creating an unequal situation for no income 
debtors. This changed with the introduction of the DRO, which is designed for debtors with no 
income or low income and which provides for debt relief after a period of one year and which the 
debtor can apply for every six years. One can say, that the British insolvency system with its five 
different procedures provides a solution for a vast majority of insolvency situations, but at the same 
time the fact that it is regulated in many different laws (Insolvency Act, County Courts Act, 
Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order) therefore making it difficult for a non-lawyer to 
weigh her options. 
Chapter three will give an overview of New Zealand insolvency Law.  







Chapter Three New Zealand Consumer Insolvency Law 
I. Introduction 
New Zealand legislation was the first country to explicitly address the no income no asset debtor.135 
In 2007, the Insolvency Act 2006 No 55 (hereafter Insolvency Act) came into force which 
established a new procedure for insolvent persons, the so-called 'No Asset Procedure’ (hereafter 
NAP).136 This was introduced against the background that the Ministry of Economic Development 
had established that since the last debt review, debts arising out of consumer credit agreements had 
become the main cause of bankruptcy.137 Especially for consumers, there are few possibilities to 
avoid future debts.138 Therefore, in these cases the criminal law provisions concerning bankruptcy 
were often inappropriate and resulted in debtors not being able to improve their financial 
situation.139 For this reason, the NAP140 has been introduced into New Zealand law.141 In addition to 
bankruptcy and the NAP, the 2006 New Zealand Insolvency Act also provides for alternative 
measures such as proposals142 and summary instalment orders143.  
 
II. History 
When it entered into force, the Insolvency Act replaced the Insolvency Act 1967. Under the old 
Act, private compromises with creditors were a possible option and still are today under the new 
law.144 According to the old legislation, there were two alternatives before bankruptcy: on the one 
hand, the debtor could present a proposal for financial restructuring for which he needed the consent 
of the creditors.145 Possible contents of this proposal were an offer to assign all or part of their 
assets to a trustee, an offer to pay by instalments, an offer to reduce debt or an offer to repay debt in 
the future.146 This procedure was retained in the new Insolvency Act and is described below.  
 On the other hand, the debtor could also apply to the court for a summary instalment order, 
which was binding on the creditors for three years, but the requirement was that the total debt of the 
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insolvent must be less than NZD 12,000.147 This procedure enabled the debtor to pay his debts in 
regular instalments.148 At the same time, they were protected from further legal proceedings as long 
as the order remained in force.149 This procedure was also adopted in the new Insolvency Act, but 
the total debt limit was raised to NZD 40,000.150  
 
III. Description of the Different Procedures 
(a) Bankruptcy  
Bankruptcy is the main procedure for those who cannot pay their debts in New Zealand insolvency 
law.151 The term 'bankruptcy' in New Zealand law means the status of a natural person who is 
declared bankrupt by the High Court at the request of the debtor herself or one of her creditors.152 
Legal persons are not covered by this term.153 As an entry requirement the debtor must have debts 
of NZD 1000 or more.154 
 When speaking of bankruptcy the procedure can be described as follows: both the debtor 
and her creditors can apply for bankruptcy. However, they must apply to different authorities. A 
creditor applies for bankruptcy at the court,155 while the debtor does so at the Assignee.156 
According to Section 3 of the Insolvency Act, ‘Assignee or Official Assignee means the Official 
Assignee for New Zealand, the Deputy Official Assignee for New Zealand, and any other Official 
Assignee or Deputy Assignee appointed under this Act’. In the bankruptcy procedure, all provable 
debts are included157 and are usually discharged after three years.158 According to Section 232(1) of 
the Insolvency Act ‘a provable debt is a debt or liability that the bankrupt owes at the time of 
adjudication; or after adjudication but before discharge, by reason of an obligation incurred by the 
bankrupt before adjudication’. However, secured debts are treated differently: The creditors of these 
debts may realise the property, value it and, in the bankruptcy proceedings prove a claim as an 
unsecured creditor for any remaining amount due after deduction of the valuation amount.159 
Alternatively the creditors may transfer the property to an Assignee and go bankrupt as an 
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unsecured creditor for the entire outstanding amount.160 By the bankruptcy adjudication the entire 
property of the bankrupt debtor is transferred to the Assignee.161 In addition, restrictions are 
imposed on the debtor. These include, for example, a restriction on entering into a business without 
the Assignee's consent or, under certain circumstances, from travelling abroad.162 The distribution 
of the insolvency assets is as follows: according to Section 243 of the Insolvency Act, secured 
creditors can choose between three different options. First, Section 243(1) (a) of the Insolvency Act 
states, that ‘a creditor may sell property subject to a charge’.163 According to Section 3 of the 
Insolvency Act a ‘charge includes a right or interest in relation to property owned by a debtor, by 
virtue of which a creditor of the debtor is entitled to claim payment in priority to other creditors; but 
does not include a charge under a charging order issued by a court in favour of a judgment creditor’. 
In other words, the creditor may realise property in which they have a right on the basis of which he 
may claim preferential satisfaction from other creditors. Second, they can value the property and 
join the bankruptcy for the outstanding amount after deduction of the valuated amount as an 
unsecured creditor.164 The third option is that the creditor assigns the right or interest to the 
Assignee for the general benefit of the creditors and joins the bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor 
for the entire debt.165 In addition, Section 273 of the Insolvency Act regulates the distribution of 
assets. After that, the Assignee first settles the preferred claims in the order of priority.166 Then the 
remaining money is distributed to the general creditors.167 The claims of the general creditors are 
equally ranking and to be paid in full.168 However, if the assets are not sufficient for this, the claims 




Another alternative is the Proposal to pay or satisfy the debts of the insolvent person to the 
creditors.171 According to Section 325(1) of the Insolvency Act, ‘insolvent means a person who is 
not bankrupt, but who is unable to pay his or her debts as they become due’. The Proposal may 
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include one or all of the measures referred to in Section 326(2) of the Insolvency Act. It must also 
be submitted to the court in the form specified in Section 327 together with a statement of affairs.172 
In addition, the Proposal must appoint a temporary trustee who must convene a creditors' meeting to 
vote on the Proposal.173 The majority of creditors and at the same time three quarters in value must 
accept the Proposal.174 The Proposal must be filed in court together with a statement of affairs and 
where possible the statement must contain a security or guarantee.175 Finally, a court must accept 
the Proposal, but not before hearing the creditors' objections.176 By approving the Proposal, the 
court binds all creditors whose debts are provable and affected.177 It should also be noted that 
creditors may not take any enforcement action without the consent of the court.178 Unlike the 
insolvent who can cancel a Proposal by filing an application, creditors cannot apply for the debtor's 
adjudication without the court's consent.179 Once the application has been approved, the debtor must 
put the Proposal into effect.180 Furthermore, the property is administered by a trustee in accordance 
with the Proposal and the proposal then is given effect to.181 Under certain circumstances, the 
Proposal may be amended or cancelled by the court.182 However, this procedure suffers from some 
disadvantages: Firstly, the approval of a clear majority of creditors is necessary.183 Secondly, an 
application must be filed with the court and no moratorium is required before the court's 
approval.184 Finally, the procedure is unsuitable for most debtors with little or no assets, as the 
threshold of Proposals acceptable to creditors is high.185 
 
(c) Summary Instalment Order  
The Summary Instalment Order is regulated in Part 5(3) of the Insolvency Act. If a debtor has 
unsecured debt they have the option to file for a Summary Instalment Order.186 Since this procedure 
only involves an application to the Assignee, it is relatively simple and therefore not very cost-
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intensive.187 However, a fee of NZD 100 must be paid by the applicant.188 The debtor then must 
inform her creditors about the submitted application as soon as possible in order for them to be able 
to assert their claims.189 The Assignee then issues a summary instalment order, whereby the 
repayment period may be up to three years and, under special circumstances up to five years.190 
This order creates the effect that all instalments must be repaid in the prescribed manner.191 At the 
same time it is not possible to continue or start proceedings against the debtor without the 
permission of the Assignee.192 In this respect Section 352(1) of the Insolvency Act defines the term 
‘proceedings’. It refers to ‘any proceeding against the person or property of the debtor in respect of 
a debt that has been shown in the debtor’s application for the summary instalment order or included 
in the summary instalment order or notified to the supervisor’.193 Section 358 of the Insolvency Act 
then regulates the distribution of instalment payments. This is done in the following order: the 
administrative costs are paid first. Next on the list are the costs and fees of the Assignee. In third 
place, the debts are settled and finally any surplus is paid out to the debtor. Furthermore, Section 
358(2) of the Insolvency Act provides that the debtor shall be released from her debts if the 
Assignee has paid in full the amounts referred to in Subsection (1).  
 
(d) The No Asset Procedure 
The No Asset Procedure (hereafter NAP) was introduced into New Zealand law by the Insolvency 
Act 2006. Pursuant to Section 361 of the Insolvency Act, the NAP was developed as a procedure 
for debtors without realisable assets. The criteria on the basis of which a debtor may file an 
application for the NAP are outlined in Section 363 of the Insolvency Act. Accordingly, the debtor 
must not have any realisable assets with the exception of assets which the debtor may retain under 
Section 158 of the Insolvency Act. In addition, the debtor must not have been previously admitted 
to the NAP.194 It is thus an opportunity that is granted only once in a lifetime. Furthermore, the 
debtor must not already have been declared bankrupt.195 Also, the applicant's debt must be in the 
range of NZD 1,000 to 47,000, with student loans being excluded. Finally, the prescribed means test 
must reveal that the applicant does not have the means to repay the amount of those debts. For this 
purpose, it is determined whether the debtor has a surplus after the usual and reasonable costs of 
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living of her household have been paid.196 This process takes into account the income of the debtor 
as well as that of any relative living with the debtor.197 The admission of the debtor to the NAP 
means that it is not possible for creditors to enforce claims against the debtor which were present at 
the time of the application and which would have been proven bankrupt.198 
 However, there are also some reasons that imply the debtor's exclusion from the NAP. These 
can be found in Section 364 of the Insolvency Act. These reasons include the possible concealment 
of assets with the intention of defrauding creditors, a fraud that would constitute a criminal offence 
in the event of bankruptcy. It also includes entering into a debt even though the debtor knows that 
he cannot repay it. Finally, the debtor cannot be admitted to the NAP if a creditor intends to apply 
for the debtor's bankruptcy and it is more beneficial for the creditor if the debtor goes bankrupt.   
 The termination of the proceedings is then governed by Section 372 of the Insolvency Act. 
Thereafter, the proceedings shall end if the Assignee terminates the participation of the debtor for 
the reasons stated in Section 373 of the Insolvency Act. These reasons include the debtor's wrongful 
admission to the NAP as well as the Assignee's conviction that the debtor's financial circumstances 
have changed so as to be able to settle the debt in full. Further reasons for the termination of the 
proceedings are the debtor's discharge, the debtor's application for her own adjudication or if a 
creditor who is entitled to do so applies for the debtor's adjudication and the debtor is adjudicated 
bankrupt.199 In principle, the debtor is automatically released from her debts after twelve months200. 
However, the Assignee can postpone the discharge by written notice if she needs time to consider 
whether the debtor's participation in the NAP should be terminated.201 This written notice must 
include an alternative date for the discharge, which must not be longer than 25 days later.202 
 Debts that have become unenforceable with the debtor's entry into the NAP are remitted to 
the debtor upon discharge.203 Thus they are not obliged to pay any part of these debts nor penalties 
and interests that may have accrued.204 However, this does not include liability for fraud or 
fraudulent conduct or debts and liabilities for which the debtor has obtained forbearance through 
fraudulent conduct.205 
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IV. Evaluation of New Zealand Insolvency Law 
With bankruptcy, proposal, summary instalment order and the NAP, the consumer has four different 
mechanisms at her disposal in the event of insolvency.  
 The NAP was developed with the underlying idea of giving people without income a way 
out of their debts. As the 2011 Ministry of Economic Development Final Report states, the NAP 
has already provided relief to over 7,000 debtors.206 In fact, the NAP achieves this goal and enables 
a fresh start for debtors.207 Especially for people who have slipped into over-indebtedness through 
circumstances beyond their control, this mechanism is a major relief that helps them get back on 
their feet. However, this study also revealed that the NAP is unsuitable for teaching debtors to 
handle money responsibly in the long term.208 Intrinsic to this procedure is that it carries the risk of 
the debtor not learning her lesson. In fact, there are some debtors who accumulate debts of the same 
amount shortly after a discharge under the NAP.209 Therefore, consideration should be given to the 
introduction of a mechanism requiring participants in the NAP to learn how to manage money 
responsibly, for example through training.  
 From the creditors' perspective, the NAP offers few advantages. According to the final 
report of the Ministry of Economic Development, according to initial estimates, the sum of debt 
relief amounts to NZD 149 million and thus indicates a loss for creditors, which can, however, be 
compensated by other measures.210 On the other hand, it is the credit providers' job to screen the 
insolvency register before a loan is provided and thus ensure that a debtor does not incur substantial 
debts. The behaviour of some credit providers has also helped to create asset-less debtors by 
exacerbating the debt problem through reckless lending. For this reason, the report also proposes to 
provide creditors with guidelines created by the legislator in order to influence the lending practices 
of the financial sector.211 Another effect of introducing the NAP is that banks and other credit 
providers have become more reluctant to grant loans to NAP debtors in the future.212 However, the 
long-term effects of this development cannot be foreseen yet.213 
In summary, it can be said that the NAP can be a relief for debtors. However, this is only applicable 
if they have learned their lesson. 
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Chapter Four German Consumer Insolvency Law 
I. Introduction 
As German law is primarily governed by written laws rather than case law, the German insolvency 
law is mainly regulated in the German Insolvency Act214. Nonetheless, there are also some 
provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure215. This chapter is focusing on German consumer 
insolvency law. It first outlines a few historical key points of German insolvency law and presents 
the scope of the German entrepreneur and consumer concept (Part II) before it then provides an 
overview of German consumer insolvency law (Part III). Then the individual steps of the 
insolvency procedure are explained in more detail in Part IV. Subsequently, the different types of 
insolvency creditors are described in Part V and the residual debt discharge procedure is explained 
in more detail (Part VI. Finally, after the outline of the restrictions on enforcement (Part VII) a 
summary of the most important points of German insolvency law is given (Part VIII). 
 
II. Historical Background 
The Insolvency Act came into force on 1 January 1999. With the passing of this law, the 
coexistence of the Bankruptcy and Settlement Acts216 was eliminated and a uniform insolvency 
proceeding was introduced.217 Prior to this reform, there was no distinction in German law between 
consumers and entrepreneurs.218 Under German law, the terms 'consumer' and 'entrepreneur' are 
defined in Sections 13 and 14 of the Civil Code. According to Section 14(1) of the German Civil 
Code219 ‘an entrepreneur means a natural or legal person or a partnership with legal personality who 
or which, when entering into a legal transaction, acts in exercise of his or its trade, business or 
profession’. In contrast to this ‘a consumer means every natural person who enters into a legal 
transaction for purposes that predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession’.220 This 
means that the classification as consumer basically depends on the purpose of the concrete legal 
transaction. If the contract has a mixed purpose (so called ‘dual-use’ cases), a consumer transaction 
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exists if the component attributable to the self-employed professional or commercial activity does 
not predominate.221  
There are also some debatable cases for example a partnership or joint heirship. What these cases 
have in common, however, is that a consumer can only be a natural person and never a legal 
person. 222  However, majorities of persons who do not pursue a commercial purpose when 
concluding the legal transaction are covered by the consumer concept of Section 13 of the German 
Civil Code.223 The consumer status is then determined separately for each person.224 For example, a 
civil-law partnership225 may also be a consumer within the meaning of the provision.226 According 
to the ruling of the European Court of Justice227, legal entities cannot in principle be consumers, but 
the partnership under civil law is not classified as a legal entity in German law.228 Therefore, the 
assessment of consumer status depends on the purpose of the partnership. As far as this is not 
commercial, the partnership acts as a consumer.229 However, this does not apply if the shareholder 
of the partnership is a legal entity.230 
Although the Bankruptcy and Composition Acts also applied to consumers, they did not contain any 
specific provisions concerning consumers. 231  The Bankruptcy Act contained rules for the 
liquidation of the debtor's assets and the subsequent distribution of the proceeds among the 
creditors, whereas, the Settlement Act wanted to give the debtor the opportunity to seek a solution 
apart from her bankruptcy through negotiations with the creditors and thus save her economic 
existence.232 In practice however, these laws were unsuitable for consumer insolvency for several 
reasons: First of all, although both laws contained rules allowing the consumer to reach an 
agreement with the creditors, this settlement required the consent of the majority of the creditors 
who had to own at least 75 percent of the claims.233 In addition, in most cases the debtor had to 
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make a minimum payment of at least 35 percent of all claims.234 Furthermore, in order to open the 
proceedings, the debtor's existing assets had to be sufficient to pay the costs of the proceedings, 
including the court costs and those of the administrator.235 This, however, meant that more than 75 
percent of the cases had to be rejected due to insufficient assets.236 The crucial problem with the old 
legislation was that the Bankruptcy Act focused on facilitating enforcement for creditors rather than 
debtor relief.237 In other words, there was no remission of unpaid debt at the end of the proceedings. 
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that every creditor who participated in the proceedings 
was given a writ of execution against the debtor allowing her to enforce into the debtor's future 
assets and income at any time during the next thirty years.238 This led to many consumers remaining 
indebted for their whole lives and often going into illegal employment.239 
 According to Section 1 of the German Insolvency Act, an important goal is the debt release 
of the debtor.240 When the new law had been drafted, the legislator also had in mind to create a 
unified process that focused on avoiding insolvency through restructuring.241 Before the Insolvency 
Act came into force, only small insolvency estates were available.242 This meant that the creditors 
received only three to five percent of their claims. Furthermore, three quarters of all insolvency 
proceedings had to be rejected due to lack of assets.243 In contrast, the Insolvency Act was to create 
a legal framework for the confiscation and distribution of debtors' assets.244 This is done by 
preventing individual creditors from accessing the insolvency assets ahead of the proceedings.245 
The aim is to increase the size of the insolvency estate so that a larger number of creditors can be 
satisfied.246 This new regulation is intended to meet the special needs of consumers.247 Smaller 
proceedings, including consumer insolvency proceedings, are more flexible, cheaper and faster than 
regular insolvency proceedings.248 
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III. Overview of the German Insolvency Law 
The consumer insolvency proceedings are regulated in Sections 304-314 of the Insolvency Act. In 
principle, the insolvency proceedings in Germany are as follows: If someone is unable or unwilling 
to fulfil an existing obligation, her creditors have the opportunity to seek government assistance.249 
This is basically done in two steps. First, the creditors have the opportunity to obtain a title in the 
main proceedings250. Thereafter, this title can be used to enforce foreclosure against the debtor.251 
The corresponding enforcement proceedings are regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
According to Section 804(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the distribution is usually done by the 
principle of priority, which at its heart means "first come, first served". However, this might lead to 
a ‘race’ of creditors, in cases where the assets of the debtor are not enough to meet all liabilities. 252  
As a result, few creditors would obtain full satisfaction while the majority would go out empty-
handed. 253  In order to prevent this, the principle of joint creditor satisfaction (par conditio 
creditorum) applies in insolvency proceedings according to Section 1 of the Insolvency Act.254 This 
means that under state supervision, the existing assets are basically divided evenly among the 
creditors. It protects, in particular, smaller creditors who do not have the ability to compete within a 
"creditors' contest".255 
 In German law, there is a special consumer insolvency procedure, which has the purpose to 
promote the mutual debt settlement in order to relieve the courts and debtors.256 The main aim is to 
settle debts by means of a waiver on the part of creditors.257 The consumer insolvency procedure is 
divided into three phases: First, the debtor should seek out-of-court debt settlement without filing 
for bankruptcy.258 If successful, insolvency proceedings are not necessary.259 Second, if the debtor's 
efforts are unsuccessful, he must file for bankruptcy and submit a debt settlement plan.260 This plan 
is the basis on which the court itself seeks a consensual debt settlement.261 The insolvency creditors 
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must review their claims indicated in the plan and agree to the plan.262 If the plan has been approved 
by all the creditors, it becomes the enforcement order.263 In this case, the application for insolvency 
is considered as withdrawn.264 Finally, if the plan is not approved, the process will result in the 
formal insolvency proceedings.265 
 
IV. The Individual Steps of the Formal Insolvency Proceedings  
(a) Written Request 
The formal insolvency proceedings begin with a written request. Such can either be provided by the 
debtor herself (own application) or by a creditor (third party request).266 Another mandatory 
requirement for the opening of insolvency proceedings is an opening reason.267 Such grounds may 
include insolvency268 and impending insolvency269 if the debtor herself applies for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 Next, an insolvency expert checks whether there is an opening reason and whether the assets 
of the debtor are at least sufficient to cover the costs of the proceedings.270 Despite the existence of 
an insolvency reason, the insolvency proceedings can only be opened if their financing is 
secured. 271  If the debtor's assets are insufficient to cover the costs of the proceedings, the 
application for opening the insolvency proceedings will be rejected due to a lack of assets, under 
Section 26(1) Insolvency Act.272 The consequence of the failure to open insolvency proceedings is 
that the debtor retains her freedom of disposal.273 However, the creditors still have the option of 
individual enforcement.274 Another consequence is that there is no debt relief.275 
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(b) Transition of Administrative and Disposition Rights 
The opening of insolvency proceedings results in the debtor losing the right to manage and sell her 
pledged assets.276 Instead, this right is transferred to a court appointed trustee.277 In addition, the 
debtor is obliged to cooperate with the trustee and to provide her with the necessary information.278 
From the opening of bankruptcy proceedings to their termination, the trustee has full control over 
all assets of the debtor and also has all decision rights.279 The trustee's powers include the right to 
reverse transactions, which took place before bankruptcy or during provisional insolvency 
proceedings and could therefore disadvantage creditors. 280  This is intended to prevent the 
insolvency assets from being harmed by the debtor's actions and to prevent the creditor from 
favouring certain creditors.281 The rules contained in the Insolvency Code are rather unspecified and 
broad in the way that they give the trustee the right to challenge such transactions for a period of up 
to ten years before the start of the proceedings.282 
 
(c) Prohibition of individual enforcement 
From this date at the latest, the insolvency creditors are prohibited from accessing the debtor's 
assets by way of individual enforcement.283 The thereby intended protection of the insolvency assets 
is additionally extended by the so-called non-return barrier of Section 88 of the Insolvency Act 
which states: 
‘If in the last month before the application for the opening of the insolvency proceedings or 
following this application, a bankruptcy creditor has secured by way of foreclosure a security 
on the assets belonging to the debtor, belonging to the insolvency estate, this security 
becomes ineffective with the opening of the proceedings’. 
According to this provision, the idea of par conditio creditorum284 is brought forward to the crisis 
period prior to insolvency.285 This is done by automatically declaring securities which are obtained 
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by compulsory execution in the last month prior to the filing of the insolvency application or 
thereafter invalid upon the opening of the proceedings.286 
 
V. Types of insolvency creditors 
There is a total of six different types of creditors. The insolvency risk they have to bear depends on 
their position and consequently on their prospects of satisfaction.287 
 
(a) Creditors with a Prospect of Complete Satisfaction 
In principle, there are two types of creditors with a prospect of complete satisfaction, the mass-
creditors and the secured creditors who are entitled to exemption and segregation. 
 
(i) Mass Creditors 
The claims of the former are called mass liabilities and are primarily satisfied from the mass 
according to Section 53 of the Insolvency Act. The mass creditors are excluded from the principle 
of equal treatment of creditors.288 They rank before the insolvency creditors and are therefore 
satisfied in advance.289 However, only the costs of the insolvency proceedings and other mass 
liabilities290 are included in the mass claims.291 The reason for this privileged treatment is that an 
orderly settlement of the insolvency proceedings should be rendered possible.292 
 
(ii) Secured Creditors 
According to Section 47 of the Insolvency Act, secured creditors are entitled to separation and 
therefore may demand the surrender of certain objects in which they have a right in rem or a 
personal right, for example in accordance with Section 985 of the German Civil Code outside the 
insolvency proceedings. 
The right to separation corresponds to the enforcement action of third parties (Section 771 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure).293 In this way, non-debtor assets are protected. 
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(iii) Creditor entitled to separate satisfaction 
In contrast, a person entitled to separate satisfaction294 has a right to preferential satisfaction from 
certain assets.295 The trustee is entitled to the valuation of these rights, which are asserted outside 
the insolvency proceedings.296 Consequently, the right of separation corresponds to the action for 
preferential satisfaction in individual enforcement.297 
 
(b) Insolvency Creditors within the Meaning of Section 38 of the Insolvency Act 
Insolvency creditors within the meaning of Section 38 of the Insolvency Act are all creditors who 
have a justified but unsecured claim without statutory preference (so-called concurrent creditors) 
against the debtor at the time of the insolvency proceedings’ opening.298 These insolvency creditors 
may only assert their claims with the trustee.299  The trustee reviews the claims which are 
asserted.300 Undisputed claims are established and participate in the distribution.301 The distribution 
is made proportionately according to the so-called insolvency dividend, which is usually around 2-5 
percent.302 
 
(c) Lower-Ranking Insolvency Creditors 
In addition, there are the sub-ordinate insolvency creditors303 who can only assert their claims in 
exceptional cases and are therefore generally left empty-handed.304 This constitutes a restriction of 
the principle of equal treatment of creditors, in that this group of creditors will not be satisfied until 
the claims of the creditors of the insolvency proceedings have been satisfied.305 
 
(d) New Creditors 
Despite the pending insolvency proceedings it is still possible for the debtor to contract with an 
unknowing contract party, since the opening of the insolvency proceedings only prevents the debtor 
to exercise dispositions.306 These new creditors can neither participate in insolvency proceedings 
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nor access the debtor's assets outside of insolvency proceedings.307 Instead they have to wait until 
the insolvency proceedings have been finished respectively until the residual debt exemption 
proceedings have been finished.308 
 
VI. The Residual-Debt Exemption Proceedings 
(a) The Process of the Residual Debt Exemption Procedure 
The residual debt exemption procedure, which was originally unknown to German law, was 
established with the 1999 law reform. At the beginning debtors, however, were reluctant to submit a 
file for consumer insolvency proceedings.309 The reason for this was that such proceedings are only 
initiated if the debtor's assets cover the costs of the proceedings.310 If this is not the case, Section 
26(1) of the Insolvency Act stipulates that the court must reject the application. In principle, poor 
parties can apply for legal aid.311 Yet, this does not apply to insolvency proceedings.312 Section 4a 
of the Insolvency Act was only introduced in 2001. According to this provision, the costs of the 
residual debt discharge procedure can be deferred if the debtor's assets are not sufficient at the time 
of the application’s filing. As a result of this possibility, the number of applications for a residual 
debt exemption procedure increased by 61.5 percent.313 The residual debt exemption procedure 
takes both social and economic aspects into account: First of all, the general personal right, i.e. its 
right to privacy and dignity, is protected.314 In addition, the debtor is to be reintegrated into 
economic life, thus preventing illegal employment.315 
 It should be noted that the claims of the creditors in the insolvency proceedings only expire 
to the extent that they are being distributed, for example in the amount of the insolvency rate.316 For 
the remaining debts, the debtor will continue to be liable even after the termination of the 
insolvency proceedings. However, there is the possibility for the debtor to undergo the residual debt 
exemption proceedings following the insolvency proceedings.317 The residual debt exemption 
proceeding terminates the debtor's subsequent liability under Section 201(1) of the Insolvency Act 
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with its future assets.318 This procedure is, in principle, a compromise between the debt-relief of 
insolvent persons and the legitimate expectations of creditors in the fulfilment of their claims.319 Its 
aim is to enable the debtor to regain her economic freedom instead of having to live permanently on 
her non-remunerated income.320 As a result of the granting of the proceeding, the debtor is 
exempted from the liabilities to the insolvency creditors that are not fulfilled in the insolvency 
proceedings and in the residual debt relief proceedings.321 Furthermore, these proceedings should 
reduce the number of over-indebted households from a social and financial perspective.322 
 The debtor must apply separately for the residual debt exemption procedure.323 In addition, 
the application must be accompanied by a declaration in which the debtor conveys all seizable 
claims for remuneration from an employment relationship or comparable remuneration for a period 
of six years after the opening of the proceedings to a trustee.324 The obligations of the debtor during 
the term of so-called ‘good behaviour’ period325 are regulated in Section 295 of the Insolvency Act. 
For instance, the debtor must do her best to satisfy her creditors as much as possible with her 
seizable income. To do so, the trustee distributes the received amounts to the insolvency creditors 
on a pro rata basis each year after the deduction of the costs of the proceedings.326 Furthermore, 
according to Section 295(1) No. 1 of the Insolvency Act, the debtor must perform appropriate 
gainful employment. In addition, in the event of unemployment, the debtor must seek a new job and 
must not refuse any reasonable employment.327 ‘Reasonable' in this sense also means that the debtor 
may have to take up an activity outside her job.328 After the expiry of the good behaviour period, the 
court grants the remaining debt exemption on the condition that there are no grounds for refusal.329 
As a result, all claims of the insolvency creditors that have not been met by then will expire.330 
According to Section 300(1) of the Insolvency Act, it is also possible for the court to decide 
prematurely on the exemption from residual debt upon application. This is the case if the experience 
costs are covered and no claims have been filed or all claims have been satisfied.331 It can either 
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happen at any time or three years after the transfer of all seizable claims to the trustee, if at least 35 
percent of the claims have been satisfied by then (in addition to the costs).332 
 
(b) Refusal of Debt Exemption 
In addition to the provisions governing the process of the residual debt exemption procedure, the 
Insolvency Act also contains reasons for the refusal of residual debt exemption. What all these 
provisions have in common is that they have their origin in the regulation that only an honest debtor 
should get the opportunity of debt relief.333 These are circumstances relating to criminal offences 
and dishonest conduct.334 As a rule, these grounds for refusal are only taken into account at the 
request of a creditor of the insolvency proceedings.335  
 
VII. Debtor Protection – Restrictions on Enforcement 
However, German law does not allow unrestricted enforcement in the assets of the debtor. 
Especially the protection of debtors in the seizure of claims, such as earned income, is important.336 
In principle, the debtor's income from work is one of the most important objects of enforcement.337 
On the other hand, the debtor needs her earned income to pay her living expenses. For this reason, 
creditors are not permitted to seize the debtor's entire income.338 Further reasons are that the debtor 
would lose the interest to work and would become a burden to the general public.339 Therefore, the 
amount that the debtor needs for living is generally excluded from the right of execution.340 The 
relevant provisions can be found in the Code of Civil Procedure.341 Income from employment 
within the meaning of Section 850 of the Code of Civil Procedure is defined as 'recurrently payable 
remuneration for employment'.342 According to a decision of the Federal Labour Court, social 
compensation also forms a part of earned income.343 The earned income can only be seized under 
consideration of the so-called seizure exemption limit.344 In order to determine an appropriate 
amount that cannot be seized, the circumstances of the individual case must be taken into 
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account.345 These include the amount of the debtor’s income, the number of her dependents and the 
legal nature of the claim to be enforced.346 According to Section 811(1) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure 'objects for personal use or household use in so far as the debtor requires them for modest 
living and housekeeping commensurate with her professional activity and her indebtedness' are 
excluded from enforcement. Furthermore, objects which the debtor needs for her employment, as 
well as pets may not be seized.347 However, this is not fully guaranteed. Rather, Sections 811a and 
811b regulate the so-called ‘exchange garnishment’, according to which one item can be exchanged 
for a less valuable similar item. For example, a colour television can be replaced by a black and 
white television.348  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
In summary, it can be stated that the key aspects of German consumer insolvency law are the 
principle of joint creditor satisfaction and the residual debt discharge procedure. In addition, 
German insolvency law also provides a mechanism to prevent insolvency proceedings by giving 
priority to out-of-court settlement. It is indeed a crucial aim to enable the debtor to be released from 
debt and to reintegrate her into society. However, the debtor must earn this privilege during the 
period of good conduct. This period is relatively long with a duration of six years and therefore 
poses a certain challenge to the debtor. Yet this is precisely how the different interests of debtors 
and creditors are balanced. Furthermore, the debtor also retains the amount of her salary that falls 
under the attachment exemption limit. She thus receives an amount that is necessary to finance her 
living expenses. In conclusion, it can be said that German law seeks to balance the various interests 
as fairly as possible, through the protective mechanisms for the debtor described above and the 
relatively long repayment of debts during the period of good conduct, while at the same time 
enabling the debtor to return to a normal, debt-free life. 
In the following chapter South African insolvency law will be described. 
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Chapter Five South African Consumer Insolvency Law 
I. Introduction  
This chapter deals with consumer insolvency law in South Africa. A notable feature of South 
African law as a whole is that it comprises various sources of law. These range from codified laws 
through case law and common law to customs and indigenous law.349 This variety of legal sources 
can also be found in South African insolvency law. The main statute of South African insolvency 
law is the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (hereafter Insolvency Act), though not the only one.350 Other 
important laws are the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 (hereafter MCA) and the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter NCA). In addition, there are some laws concerning the insolvency of 
companies.351 Furthermore, decisions of the high courts, for example the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa and common law principles must be taken into account.352 The South African 
Constitution also plays an important role, as it is the highest law of the South African legal system 
and thus sets the norm to be met by all other laws.353 In the area of insolvency law, various 
fundamental rights are affected,354 which results in the fact that several insolvency regulations are 
subject to the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court but also lower ranking courts.355 
 Unlike most legal systems, South African insolvency law does not primarily aim at releasing 
the debtor from her liabilities.356 Instead, the main objective of the South African Insolvency Act is 
the orderly and fair distribution of the debtor's assets.357 This objective comes to the fore especially 
when the debtor's assets are not sufficient to satisfy all her liabilities towards creditors.358 A 
decisive element of South African insolvency law is its creditor friendliness.359 While the global 
trend tends to support insolvent consumer debtors through debt relief, the requirements for South 
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African debt relief although they exist, can hardly be met. 360The majority of the debtors concerned 
belong to the 'No Income No Assets' group, the so-called NINA debtors.361 
 Part II of this chapter discusses the history of South African insolvency law, its roots in 
Roman law and the elements which are still part of today’s insolvency law. Special attention is 
drawn to the latest developments in South African insolvency law. After an overview of South 
African insolvency law (Part III), the individual requirements of the insolvency proceedings are 
explained in more detail (Part IV). Finally, the last part summarises the most important aspects of 
South African insolvency law. 
 
II. History of South African Insolvency Law 
(a) Early History and Overview over the Laws currently in Force 
Although consumer insolvency law is often seen as a new achievement, the history of South African 
law can be traced back to Roman law.362 One of the first forms of consumer protection was 
probably the ultra duplum rule, according to which arrears and interest could not exceed the original 
loan amount.363 This rule is still valid today in South Africa in that it was initially not only an 
integral part of South African jurisprudence but was also finally incorporated in the NCA.364 
 The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, still in force today, replaced Insolvency Act 32 of 1916 in 
1936, which in turn had replaced statutory law in 1916.365 It is important to point out that the 
Insolvency Act of 1936 is not a codification of the common law of insolvency, although the latter 
with some modifications, forms the basis of the Insolvency Act.366 This means that the common law 
of insolvency applies in addition to the Insolvency Act to the extent that it has not been amended or 
invalidated by the Act.367 In other words common law is always used as a complementary measure 
if the Insolvency Act does not contain any regulations.368  
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(b) The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
With the passing of the NCA, the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 and Usury Act 73 of 1968 
were revoked.369 The Usury Act aimed at protecting credit receivers from excessive interest rates by 
regulating the financial aspects of money lending agreements, lease agreements on movable assets, 
rendering of services and the sale of movable goods.370 Whereas the Credit Agreements Act 
regulated the contractual aspects of credit agreements that is for example the written format and the 
deposit it required.371 Although these laws should have complemented each other, their areas of 
application overlapped, thus causing various problems in the area of consumer credit law.372 These 
problems mainly existed due to the fact that these laws regulated credit agreements in a complicated 
and ineffective way.373 
 The aim of the NCA is to solve problems of the consumer credit market, such as prohibition 
of reckless lending by credit providers, the prevention and alleviation of the over-indebtedness of 
consumers, and the prevention of the high costs of credit.374 This will be achieved, inter alia, 
through the establishment of the National Credit Regulator (hereafter NCR) and the National 
Consumer Tribunal (hereafter Tribunal).375 The law requires credit providers, credit bureaus and 
debt counsellors to register with the NCR.376 In addition, the law also sets limits for interest rates 
and other (non-interest) credit costs.377 Another objective of the NCA is to provide debt relief for 
consumers.378 Yet, similarly to the Insolvency Act, the NCA does not intend to achieve this goal by 
discharging consumer debt.379 Rather, this goal is to be achieved by restructuring debt.380  
 
(c) The National Credit Amendment Act 
According to the Memorandum on the Objects of the National Credit Amendment Bill (hereafter 
Memorandum) which was published in the Government Gazette by the Portfolio Committee on 
Trade and Industry (hereafter Committee) on 24 November 2017 together with the National Credit 
Amendment Bill, there were 24.68 million credit-active consumers in South Africa in March 2017. 
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Roughly 40 percent (9.69 million) of these consumers were in a state in which they could be 
described as over-indebted.381 In the Memorandum, the Committee furthermore acknowledges that 
existing insolvency mechanisms do not adequately address the group of debtors with little or no 
income and assets and thus there is a need for a specific insolvency procedure tailored to that 
group.382 These considerations were the reason for establishing the debt intervention regulated in 
the National Credit Amendment Act (hereafter Act). Furthermore, the Act introduces mechanisms 
to protect consumers, such as mandatory registration for credit providers.383 Failure to register is 
considered to be a criminal offence.384 Also, a debt counsellor will be required to always scrutinise 
a credit agreement for being reckless and not only do so at the request of the consumer. 385 
 
III. The Insolvency Procedures of South African Insolvency Law 
Over-indebted consumers in South Africa currently have three alternatives for debt relief. Initially, 
there is sequestration under the Insolvency Act. This method is the only one under which debts are 
discharged.386 However, the sequestration does not aim at the discharge.387 Instead, the latter is 
merely an accompanying effect.388 Furthermore, there is the administrative procedure under Section 
74 of the Magistrate's Courts Act 32 of 1944 and the debt review under Section 86 of the NCA. 
 
(a) Sequestration under the Insolvency Act 
 In South African Law there are two ways of sequestrating a debtor’s estate: the voluntary 
surrender where the debtor herself applies to the court and the compulsory surrender where a 
creditor or creditors apply to the court.389 Both procedures differ in their processing and the 
necessary prerequisites.390 The granting of sequestration order by the court means that the debtor 
loses the right of disposal over his assets.391 
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(i) Voluntary Surrender 
a) Requirements 
The conditions for the court to accept the voluntary surrender are the following: first, the debtor's 
estate must be insolvent.392 Furthermore, she must have sufficient assets to cover the costs of 
enforcement.393 Finally, enforcement must also be to the creditors' advantage.394  
i) Insolvency of Debtors Estate 
The term 'insolvent' is defined in Section 2 of the Insolvency Act as ‘a debtor whose estate is under 
sequestration and includes such a debtor before the sequestration of his estate, according to the 
context’. An ‘insolvent estate' means ‘an estate under sequestration’395 However, there is no 
definition of the term 'insolvency'. Although ‘insolvency’ is commonly understood as being unable 
to pay ones debts, this definition is not accurate from a legal point of view.396 Instead, the question 
must be asked ‘whether the debtor’s liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets, fairly valued’ 
(insolvency test).397 However, it should be noted that the inability to pay debts does not necessarily 
indicate insolvency.398 Rather, proof of insolvency is only an appearance by which the burden of 
proof that the assets are higher than the liabilities passes to the debtor.399 Even if a person with 
insufficient assets passes the insolvency test, he will not be treated as insolvent from the legal point 
of view unless there is a court order for sequestration.400 This order is defined as ‘any order of Court 
whereby an estate is sequestrated and includes a provisional order, when it has not been set aside’401 
and it constitutes the formal declaration that the debtor is insolvent.402 The term ‘insolvent’ can be 
used to describe both: the debtor herself and also her estate.403 It has two different meanings when 
used to describe the debtor. On the one hand, it may mean that the debtor's assets have been 
sequestrated.404 On the other hand, it also includes debtors whose liabilities exceed her assets but 
whose estate is not yet sequestrated.405 
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 The debtor must prepare and submit a statement of affairs to determine her assets and 
liabilities.406 However, the court is not bound by this statement.407 Consequently, it may also 
conclude that the debtor is insolvent even though her liabilities do not exceed her assets.408 
According to the test applied by the court, the question is whether it is established that the debtor 
does not have enough money to pay his debts in full and whether it is impossible for the assets to 
yield enough for this purpose.409  
ii) Costs of Sequestration are covered by estate 
Another condition of voluntary surrender is that the debtor has sufficient realisable assets to cover 
all the costs of the sequestration.410 These are, according to the law, to be paid out of the free 
residue of her assets.411 In this context, ‘free residue’ means ‘means that portion of the estate which 
is not subject to any right of preference by reason of any special mortgage, legal hypothec, pledge 
or right of retention’.412 According to Article 97 of the Insolvency Act, the costs of sequestration 
include both the costs of surrender and the costs of administration. Furthermore, Section 2 of the 
Insolvency Act states that free residue ‘in relation to an insolvent estate, means that portion of the 
estate which is not subject to any right of preference by reason of any special mortgage, legal 
hypothec, pledge or right of retention’. 
 Conversely, it can be concluded from the requirement of sufficient assets that no voluntary 
surrender is possible in the case of insufficient assets.413 However, this does not mean that no 
seizure will take place in this case. Rather, assets which consist only of liabilities can be subject to 
compulsory sequestration.414 If the costs of sequestration are obviously not covered by the free 
residue, the court must reject the application for sequestration.415 The lack of assets cannot be 
compensated by a guarantee, as it does not create real assets for the debtor.416 The situation is quite 
different, however, if it is not clear whether the debtor's assets are sufficient to pay the costs of 
sequestration. In this case, the application may be accepted by the court as a guarantee removes the 
uncertainty about the existence of assets.417 
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iii) The Sequestration must be to the Advantage of the Creditors 
A further criterion for sequestration is that the sequestration must be to the advantage of the 
creditors. This is one of the main criteria of the Insolvency Act and has been enshrined in 
insolvency law since 1916.418 Before the court can confirm a sequestration order, it must be ensured 
that the debtor's creditors benefit from the sequestration of her estate.419 In this context ‘to the 
advantage of the creditors’ means ‘the advantage of all creditors or at least the general body of 
creditors’.420 In determining whether there is an advantage for the creditors, the court often takes the 
creditors’ view as a basis, in particular whether they want the sequestration, since it assumes that 
they know what is to their advantage.421 Furthermore, it must be to the advantage of a significant 
number of creditors in relation to the value of their claims.422 
 
 b) Application of Surrender 
In order to submit an application of surrender to court, the debtor must submit a notice of motion 
and an affidavit.423 The content of the affidavit must be facts which give reason to the court to issue 
a sequestration order.424 
 
(ii) Compulsory Surrender 
Another method of sequestration is that of compulsory surrender, which is carried out by the 
creditors. In order for the court to issue an order for sequestration, the following preconditions must 
be met: Firstly, the applicant creditor must be entitled to a claim giving her a right of sequestration 
under Section 9 of the Insolvency Act.425 Secondly, the debtor must be insolvent or have committed 
an Act of Insolvency within the meaning of Section 8 of the Insolvency Act.426 Finally, there must 
also be a reason to believe that the sequestration is for the creditor’s advantage.427 In the case of 
compulsory sequestration, the burden of proof for the existence of these three conditions remains 
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with the creditor.428 It is precisely the proof of the second condition that will typically cause the 
creditor difficulties.429 To address this problem, Section 8 of the Insolvency Act provides for acts 
and omissions which enable the creditor, if the debtor commits them, not to having to prove her 
actual insolvency.430  
 
(iii) The Effects of the Sequestration Order 
The sequestration order results in a concursus creditorum.431 Also, the individual creditors lose their 
rights in favour of the creditors as a group.432 In other words, an individual creditor can no longer 
take any further measures affecting the other creditors’ rights.433 Furthermore, the sequestration 
order also concerns other matters, such as incomplete contracts, liens and set-off.434 The bankrupt 
has no express right to apply for the release of his assets, but if he provides sufficient security, the 
sheriff must release the assets.435 
 The effects of sequestration order are set out in Section 20 of the Insolvency Act. For 
example, the debtor is divested of her assets and these are temporarily transferred to the master 
before being transferred to the trustee.436  
 
(iv) Realisation and Distribution of the Assets 
The trustee's responsibility is to liquidate the insolvency assets for the creditors’ benefit.437 This 
also includes the realisation of any of the spouse’s assets to which the trustee is entitled.438 The 
realisation of the property is carried out according to the manner and conditions which the creditors 
instruct the trustee.439 If the creditors have not given instructions to the trustee after the second 
meeting, the realisation of the property takes place by public auction.440 There are three different 
types of creditors: preferent, secured and concurrent creditors. According to Section 2 of the 
Insolvency Act, ‘preference’ is defined as means ‘the right to payment of that claim out of the assets 
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of the estate in preference to other claims’. In other words, it means that a preferent creditor is paid 
before the other creditors. Although a secured creditor in the general sense is also a preferent 
creditor, the term preferent creditor is commonly used for creditors with unsecured claims but who 
yet have priority over concurrent creditors.441 Claims which enjoy preferential treatment are those 
listed in Section 96 to 102 of the Insolvency Act. These include funeral and death-bed expenses442, 
costs of sequestration443, costs of execution444, salary or renumeration of former employees of the 
insolvent445, statutory obligations446, income tax447 and claims arising out of general bonds448. Yet 
some of these categories are subject to statutory limitations.449 For any amount that exceeds the 
threshold, the creditors may join the concurrent creditors.450 Secured creditors on the other hand are 
those who have a right to a property belonging to the insolvency assets on the basis of a special 
mortgage, a landlord’s legal hypothec, a pledge or a right to retention.451 Additionally, secured 
creditors have a claim as a concurrent creditor on the outstanding amount to the extent their claim 
has not been satisfied with the proceeds of the property.452 The third category, the concurrent 
creditors, on the other hand, does not benefit from any advantage. Rather, these creditors are 
satisfied by the remaining assets, the free residue.453 Given that concurrent creditors are of equal 
rank, they receive a proportionate share to their claim if the insolvency assets are not sufficient to 
fully satisfy all creditors.454  
 
(v) Composition and Rehabilitation 
There are two different ways for the debtor, to prevent the liquidation of her assets through a 
compromise with her creditors. One of these options is known as common-law compromise.455 This 
is a compromise based on a contract with the creditors and therefore requires the consent of all of 
them to come into effect.456 This form of compromise is a means of preventing insolvency if the 
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debtor is on the verge of insolvency or her assets are subject to temporary sequestration. 457 
However, if the debtors assets have already been sequestered she can circumvent liquidation by 
seeking compromise as stated in Section 119 of the Insolvency Act.458 In contrast to the common-
law compromise, this so-called statuary law composition is advantageous in that it does not require 
all creditors’ cooperation but rather only the approval of a certain majority.459  
 By the debtor’s rehabilitation her insolvency is terminated and she is given a fresh start, 
unencumbered by any debts and restrictions. 460  The rehabilitation generally takes place 
automatically with expiry of a certain deadline, usually 10 years after sequestration, but the debtor 
has the possibility of applying to the court for preliminary rehabilitation. 461  The effect of 
rehabilitation is the termination of the sequestration process and thus the debtor’s release from all 
debts that arose before sequestration and from any impairment caused by sequestration.462 
 
(b) Administration Order in Terms of the Magistrate’s Courts Act 
A debtor whose debt amounts to R50 000 or less may apply for an administration order.463 This 
procedure is intended for bankruptcies where the assets are too small for sequestration as its costs 
would consume all the assets.464 The administration order aims to ‘assist a debtor over a period of 
financial embarrassment without the need for sequestration’.465 However, this procedure also has 
some disadvantages: there is no discharge for debts or costs in this procedure.466 In addition, the 
procedure does not have a time limit for repayment.467 Moreover, the administration order only 
expires when all creditors have been fully paid.468 Since debts that are due as a result of future 
instalments due under an existing and enforceable contract (so-called in futuro debts) are excluded 
from the administration order, the procedure is in principle nothing more than a debt 
rescheduling.469 It should be noted that Section 74 of the MCA doesn’t contain any period for the 
repayment of the debts under an administration order. Rather, the period and the amount of debt 
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repayment only play a subordinate role in the courts decision on whether to grant an administration 
order.470 This is supported by the fact that unlike the sequestration, the administration order doesn’t 
have the ‘advantage to the creditors’ as a requirement.471  
 In order to apply for an administration order, the debtor must submit an application and a 
statement of affairs in which she confirms under oath that the creditors’ names, the sum of the debts 
and all other details correspond to the truth.472 The fact that the debtor cannot pay her debts on their 
due date is the basis for an application.473 After a hearing, the court issues an administration order. 
This serves to assist the debtor by appointing an administrator who takes control of the debtor's 
financial affairs and manages the payment of the debts.474 In particular, the administration or 
declaration comprises the declaration that the debtor's assets have been placed under the control of 
an administrator, that this administrator has been appointed and the amount to be paid by the 
debtor.475 
 On the basis of this administration order, the debtor is obliged to make regular payments to 
the administrator, which the latter then distributes to the creditors after deduction of her expenses 
and a specified tariff remuneration.476 The administrator’s costs may amount up to 12.5 percent of 
the money received.477 A limited concursus creditorum is activated by the administration order.478 
This means that individual creditors are prevented under Section 74P of the MCA from continuing 
their individual remedies against the debtor or the debtor’s assets after the administration order has 
been issued.479 Nevertheless, all debts including interest and costs must be repaid since, in contrast 
to sequestration which is followed by rehabilitation, there is no limited repayment period for 
administration or repayment.480 For this reason, the administration order often leads to exploding 
costs. As a result, the debtor remains trapped in her hopeless situation instead of relieving herself of 
her debts.481 Although debtors are often in arrears for these reasons and the administration order can 
therefore strictly speaking not be regarded as a debt relief measure, the administration order has 
                                               
470 Andre Boraine; Corlia van Heerden; Melanie Roestoff, A Comparison between Formal Debt Administration and 
Debt Review - the Pros and Cons of These Measures and Suggestions for Law Reform (Part 1), 45 De Jure 80 (2012) at 
85; Ex Parte August 2004 3 SA 268 (W) 273. 
471 Ex Parte August 2004 3 SA 268 (W) 273: Boraine et al op cit note 470 at 85. 
472 MCA, Section 74A(3). 
473 Boraine et al op cit note 470. 
474 Ibid at 84. 
475 MCA, Section 74C. 
476 MCA, Sections 74L and 74J; Boraine et al op cit note 470 at 84. 
477 MCA, Section 74L(2). 
478 Madari v Cassim 1950 2 SA 35 (D) 38; Ex Parte Fortuin v Various Creditors 2004 2 SA 570 (C) 574; Ex Parte 
August 2004 3 SA 268 (W) 272. 
479 Boraine et al op cit note 470 at 92. 






surprisingly become very popular over the years, which could also be attributed to the strong 
growth of the microcredit sector.482 In fact, there is even reference to a whole 'industry', which is 
also accused of being under-regulated and therefore subject to abuse.483 One of the reasons given 
for this is that unscrupulous administrators were blackmailing debtors.484  As a result, these 
consumers are stuck in their current situation instead of deleveraging.485 Although this is not 
proven, it is considered certain that especially people who rely on microcredit providers ultimately 
end up in the system of administration order and thus worsen their situation instead of freeing 
themselves from their debts.486 Furthermore, this remedy is only available up to a debt limit of 
R50,000.487 This excludes those whose debts exceed this amount, but who are also excluded from 
rehabilitation after sequestration because they cannot provide an advantage to the creditors as 
required by Section 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. Thus, there is a regulatory gap for these debtors, 
which means that they do not have access to debt relief measures.488 On the other hand, the 
administration order, despite its shortcomings and problems, can also represent a relief for the 
debtor.489 
 
(c) Debt Review under the National Credit Act 
The National Credit Act deals with debt relief measures in connection with over-indebtedness and 
reckless lending in Chapter 4 Part D. In the context of the NCA, the term over-indebtedness has a 
very specific meaning since it applies only to credit agreement debts to which the Act is 
applicable.490 A definition of the term ‘over-indebtedness’ can be found in Section 79(1) of the 
NCA. The determination of whether a consumer is over-indebted is made on the basis of the criteria 
set out in Section 79(1) of the NCA. The existence of these criteria depends on the time at which the 
determination is made.491 This is different however, if the debtor's over-indebtedness is caused by 
the conclusion of a certain credit agreement.492 In this case, a credit agreement may constitute 
reckless lending.493 According to the definition of ‘reckless’ in Section 80(1) of the NCA over-
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indebtedness at the time the credit agreement is concluded only has an impact if reckless lending is 
identified as the reason for over-indebtedness. 494 It may be useful to have some credit agreements 
declared reckless, as this can have an impact on the insolvency proceedings.495 The reckless 
declaration of a credit agreement can lead to sanctions being taken against the credit provider, 
which can be to the creditor's advantage.496 Under the NCA, the over-indebtedness is to be 
overcome by debt review and restructuring of the credit agreement.497 
 The scope of the NCA covers natural persons irrespective of the amount of the credit and 
therefore is much broader than the Usury Act which only applied to credit agreements with a 
principal debt of R500 000 or less and which merely set a maximum interest limit.498 Legal persons, 
however, are not fully protected as consumers.499 The debt review process is governed by Section 
86 of the NCA. It usually begins with the consumer's application to a debt counsellor with the aim 
of being declared over-indebted and placed under debt review.500 Alternatively, the application can 
be made to a court, which then forwards the matter to a debt counsellor.501 The debt counsellor's 
responsibility is to review the credit agreements to determine whether the debtor is over-indebted 
and whether reckless credit has been granted.502  In determining over-indebtedness, the debt 
counsellor should take into account the consumer’s ‘financial means, prospects and obligations’.503 
‘Financial means’ refers to both assets and liabilities whereas ‘prospects' means prospects for an 
improvement in the consumer’s financial situation, such as increases and liquidations of assets.504 
Consequently, for credit agreements involving goods, the financial resources and prospects must 
include the prospect of selling the goods in order to reduce the consumer's indebtedness.505 The debt 
review is followed in the second stage by the completion of the over-indebtedness and the 
restructuring carried out by the court within the meaning of Section 138 of the NCA.506 The 
methods available to the court for debt restructuring are various. They include: extending the period 
of the agreement and reducing the amount of each payment due accordingly, the postponement of 
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the dates on which payments are due under the agreement during a specified period, extending the 
period of the agreement and postponing during a specified period the dates on which payments are 
due under the agreement; or recalculation of the consumer's obligations because of contraventions 
of Part A (unlawful agreements and provisions) or B (disclosure, form and effect) of Chapter 5 or 
Part A (collection and repayment practices) of Chapter 6.507  
 
(d) The Debt Intervention Procedure 
In addition to the three existing insolvency procedures, debt intervention is to be incorporated into 
the NCA as a new mechanism especially for impecunious debtors who are not granted access to 
debt relief.508 The Amendment Act’s intention is, hence, to bridge the gap between the conflicting 
statements of the NCA. On the one hand the purpose of the NCA is ‘to promote and advance the 
social and economic well-being of South Africans, to promote a fair, transparent, competitive, 
sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market economy, and to protect 
consumers’.509 On the other hand, however, existing provisions of insolvency law are inadequate, 
either because they require income or assets in favour of creditors or because they entail excessive 
costs.510 Especially the sequestration procedure, which is the only one to provide for debt relief, 
requires a high asset threshold in that the sequestration must be to the creditors’ advantage. This 
compares to a rather high unemployment rate of 27.6 percent (in the first quarter of 2019).511 In this 
context, it is recognised that this unequal treatment on the basis of the level of income constitutes 
unjustified discrimination which makes it impossible for many consumers to escape their desolate 
financial situation.512 Therefore, the Bill in its preamble strives to protect all consumers irrespective 
of their income through a ‘fair, transparent, sustainable and responsible process’. With this aim, the 
foundation is laid for the incorporation of debt intervention into the NCA. First of all, clause 1(b) 
will introduce a legal definition of debt intervention into the NCA. It reads as follows: ‘debt 
intervention means a measure as contemplated in Section 86A, which aims to assist identified 
consumers for whom existing natural person insolvency measures are not accessible in practice’.  
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(i) The Requirements for the Debt Intervention Procedure 
Section 86A of the Act, then describes the requirements for debt intervention in further detail. 
Before the individual requirements of the debt intervention will be illustrated, it is first necessary to 
clarify who is covered by the term debt intervention applicant. Pursuant to Section 1(b)(b), a debt 
intervention applicant must meet the following criteria: First, it must be a natural person. Secondly, 
this person must be a consumer under an unsecured credit agreement. Thirdly, the applicant must 
not have any income respectively an income not exceeding R7 500 per month. Fourthly, the 
applicant must be over indebted and finally must not be sequestrated or subject to an administration 
order. If these criteria are met, an individual qualifies as a debt intervention applicant.  
 By virtue of Section 86A(1) of the Act, the debt intervention applicant’s total unsecured debt 
may not exceed R50 000. Total unsecured debts are defined as ‘the total of all principal debts due 
by a debt intervention applicant under the unsecured credit agreements, unsecured short term credit 
transactions or unsecured credit facilities to which the debt intervention applicant is a party’.513 
However, total unsecured debt resulting from a developmental credit agreement pursuant to Section 
10(1) of the NCA and, subject to Section 85(c), credit agreements in respect of which the lender has 
already taken measures as provided for in Section 130 of the NCA, namely an application for a 
court order to enforce the credit agreement, are excluded from debt intervention.514 The debt 
intervention procedure also provides for the applicant to receive both counselling and training in 
financial literacy.515  
 
(ii) The Application Process 
The debt review process is initiated by an application of an individual for a declaration of over 
indebtedness. This application is submitted to the NCR.516 The NCR must issue the applicant with a 
receipt of the application and inform all creditors listed in the application as well as all registered 
credit bureaus.517 Pursuant to the reference in Section 86A(3) of the Act to Section 86(6) of the 
NCA, the NCR must establish whether the consumer is over indebted and whether credit 
agreements can be subsumed under the category of reckless lending. If so, Section 86A(6)(c) of the 
                                               
513 Clause 1(f) of the Act. 
514 Act, Section 86A(2).  
515 Act, Section 86A(5).  
516 Act, Section 86A(1). 





Act provides that the NCR shall refer the credit agreement to the Tribunal. The Tribunal then has 
the power to declare it void.518 
The creditor providers and the debtor also have certain obligations. These are laid down in 
Section 86A(4) of the Act in conjunction with Section 86(5) of the NCA. According to this, both 
the credit providers and the debtor must support the NCR in its task of debt intervention by 
complying with every reasonable demand.519 Furthermore, they must participate in good faith in the 
debt intervention process.520 The NCR then assesses the application and determines the further 
progress of the procedure, the possibilities of which are set out in Section 86A(6) of the Act. These 
possibilities differ according to whether the applicant qualifies for debt intervention or not. 
Accordingly, if the applicant does not qualify, there are the following options: if the applicant is 
clearly not eligible for debt intervention, the application must be rejected by the NCR.521 However, 
if the applicant does not meet the requirements for debt intervention and still has or is likely to have 
difficulties to pay her debts, the NCR must propose that the debtor and the concerned credit 
providers consider debt re-arrangement. 522  Nonetheless, this opportunity should be viewed 
critically, as a debtor who is unable to pay her debts, or who is very likely on the verge of being 
unable to paying her debts, has a weak negotiating position vis-à-vis an experienced 
businessperson, the credit provider, and thus has difficulties adequately protecting and enforcing her 
interests. For this reason, this option does not represent a significant improvement on the existing 
debt measures.  
If the applicant meets the conditions for debt intervention, there are two different scenarios: 
First, there is the possibility that the debt will be re-arranged with a repayment period of five years 
or longer. In this case, the NCR must refer the matter to the Tribunal for and provide a 
recommendation. The court then has the task of issuing an order as described in Section 87(1A) of 
the Act.523 Second, the NCR must refer the matter to the Tribunal, which will issue an order under 
Section 87A of the Act, if the income from the application is not sufficient to restructure her debts 
over a period of 5 years.524 The order under Section 87A(2) of the Act includes either that the 
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applicant does not qualify for the debt intervention525 or that all her qualifying credit contracts are 
suspended for a period of 12 months526. This period may be extended by a further 12 months.527  
Section 87A(3) of the Act then contains some aspects to be taken into account by the 
Tribunal in its decision. These aspects include whether the applicant has ever applied for debt 
intervention, sequestration or an administration order before.528 They also include whether the 
applicant has ever had debt written off by a court order.529 As a further factor, the Tribunal must 
consider whether the applicant concerned is a disabled person, a minor running a household, a 
woman running a household or an old person.530 This provision is rather questionable as it raises 
some concerns: Firstly, it is not quite clear, why these groups of individuals are mentioned 
separately, since except minors these groups of individuals have full legal capacity. Secondly, the 
provision might either be made under the assumption that households are only run by women not 
men or it is to be wondered whether households run by men fall within the scope of this 
provision.531 On the other hand it may be interpreted as an effort by the legislator to support 
particularly underprivileged groups. In addition, the Tribunal must also consider actions and 
omissions of the debt intervention applicant and creditors.532 As per Section 87A(5)(a), eight 
months after the debt intervention order, under subsection (2)(b), the NCR must evaluate whether 
the applicant has sufficient income or assets to allow for restructuring her debts within a period of 
five years as described in Section 86A(6)(d). If not, the NCR may extend the period for another 
year, with a review after eight months.533 Should the applicant not be able to meet her obligations 
and repay her debts despite all possible remedies taken, there is the possibility to have the tribunal 
declare these debts extinguished.534 The Tribunal may also order participation in a financial literacy 
program.535 The Bill furthermore provides for mandatory credit life insurance.536 This means the 
consumer is required to arrange for credit life insurance for the duration of the credit agreement, if 
the principal debts amount to R50 000 or less and the duration of the credit agreement exceeds six 
months.537 
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Finally, the debt intervention procedure will be terminated by the debtor’s rehabilitation. 
After the Tribunal has declared the debtor’s debts extinguished by virtue of Section 87A(6), the 
debtor may submit an application for a rehabilitation order to the NCR.538 The Tribunal will then 
issue the requested order, if all the requirements set out in Section 88B are met. As an effect of the 
rehabilitation order, any limitations on the rights of the debtor end 60 days from the date of the 
order.539 Furthermore, all credit providers listed in the application and every registered credit bureau 
will be informed of the rehabilitation order.540  
 
IV. Evaluation of the Debt Intervention Procedure in South Africa  
 The introduction of the Act in South Africa is seen very ambivalently. While the 
Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry Joanmarie Fubbs described the Act 
as an achievement as it ‘will strengthen the National Credit Amendment Act which enabled South 
Africa to withstand the worst effects of the global financial meltdown in 2008’ and ‘for the first 
time in SA, [..] the plight of the poor and low-income worker who is over-indebted’ will be 
addressed,541 there is also a number of opposition to the Bill. An argument against the introduction 
of the debt relief procedure is that it will lead to an 'economic upheaval' in that banks have to 
mitigate their increased risk of losing money through higher interest rates for people on low 
incomes.542 According to the critics of the Bill it would also mean that consumers would have to 
pay higher interest rates overall.543 On the other hand, however, the Bill can be a step towards 
eliminating the informal financial sector, as it requires credit providers to register and, if they fail to 
do so, they commit a criminal offence and can be arrested.  
 Another aspect Fubbs highlights is the possibility for the court to lower interest rates down 
to zero, so as to assist the debtor in paying back her debts.544 That is however precisely what 
concerns the critics. One crucial aspect of their criticism is that the debt relief procedure is nothing 
more than an unconstitutional deprivation of property. Yet, it can be argued that the credit provider 
possibly already lost her investment and thus her property by the time the debtor files for a Debt 
Relief Order if the debtor can no longer service the loan and can therefore no longer be 
expropriated. It must furthermore be borne in mind that debt relief is just an ultima ratio and that 
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the debtor must first make an effort to repay the debt over a certain period of time. Only if no other 
remedies show promise, then the debtor may apply for debt relief. With this regulation the legislator 
has created a sufficient barrier to protect the creditors' property. Ultimately, it is the credit provider's 
responsibility to ensure that the debtor is creditworthy before granting her a loan.  
 It could also be argued that debt relief harms the debtor more than it helps, since the debtor 
does not have to take responsibility for her over-indebtedness and therefore learns nothing from it, 
as is often the case under the New Zealand NAP. Unlike in New Zealand, however, the South 
African debt relief procedure contains an obligation to participate in financial literacy training. It 
remains to be seen whether this measure will contribute to reducing the growing number of debtors. 
The Act must, furthermore, withstand the allegation that it shifts the balance between the rights of 
credit providers and debtors too much towards debtor protection and thus fails to take sufficient 
account of the credit providers’ rights. It must be noted, however, that South African insolvency 
law, unlike many legal systems worldwide, is still strongly creditor-oriented and the satisfaction of 
creditors is a vital element. Consequently, it is the Act that represents a step towards balancing the 
conflicting rights of debtors and creditors, by providing a fresh start to all honest but unfortunate 
debtors, not only debtors with assets. A widespread assumption, which is also often used as an 
argument by supporters of the Act, is that a fresh start for debtors will boost the country's economy, 
as a debt-free individual is able to participate in the economy by spending money. However, 
opponents argue that the long-term consequences of the debt relief have not been thoroughly 
reasoned. As Cas Coovadia, Managing Director of the Banking Association South Africa stated: 
‘The consequences of the proposed broadened scope of the Act for consumers, the economy and 
sectors such as banking, retail, and micro-lending, have not been subjected to an in-depth social and 
economic impact assessment and engagement with relevant stakeholders’.545 Yet, the effects of 
introducing the debt relief procedure are not entirely unpredictable, as their critics say. On the 
contrary, New Zealand adopted the NAP in 2005 which is quite similar to the debt relief procedure. 
The procedure was evaluated in 2011 and the results were published in the New Zealand Ministry 
of Economic Development’s Evaluation of the No Asset Procedure, Final Report. Consequently, 
there is some experience available which can be used as a guideline for assessing the impact the 
debt relief procedure might have on the economy. The survey revealed that the NAP enabled 
debtors who had become insolvent as a result of an unexpected life event a fresh start.546 A vast 
majority of NAP participants were able to manage their finances in such a way that they could 
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either save money or at least cover their expenses with their income.547 Although NAP participants 
didn’t necessarily manage to get employment, the predominant part of them did not incur any new 
debts. There were two reasons for this: some of the NAP participants, about 42 percent, did not 
apply for a new loan, which suggests there was a learning process. On the other hand, it was likely 
due to the fact that banks and credit providers were reluctant or unwilling to grant loans to 
registered NAP participants or open a bank account for them due to their increased risk of loss.548 
Further negative effects for the NAP participants were the loss of the job and difficulties in finding 
accommodation as landlords refuse to rent to NAP debtors.549 It remains to be seen how these 
aspects will develop in South Africa.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In summary, it can be said that South African insolvency law has been shaped by various cultural 
influences throughout its history. Just as diverse as the South African culture are the existing 
insolvency remedies. There are currently three existing procedures, sequestration, administration 
order and debt review, which suffer from significant weaknesses, as only the first one provides for 
debt relief. This is a critical issue to the extent that sequestration, and thus debt relief, brings with it 
a certain financial hurdle and is therefore inaccessible to the vast majority of debtors, especially to 
the most vulnerable group, the no income no asset debtors. Administration order and debt relief are 
in principle only a rearrangement of the existing debts and usually lead to an increase in the debt of 
the insolvent due to the legal costs, whereby her situation is aggravated. A significant number of 
these debtors thus had no chance of escaping the debt trap. However, the current situation will 
evolve as the amendments of the National Credit Amendment Act came into force thereby 
establishing the Debt Intervention Procedure. While this new procedure initially attempts to 
restructure debts, it also provides debt relief in cases of severe over-indebtedness with no prospect 
of recovery. Furthermore, measurements such as mandatory financial literacy programs will be 
introduced to prevent a recurring insolvency of the debtor. It can be concluded that these 
amendments also represent a step away from the creditor friendliness of South African Insolvency 
Law towards enhanced consumer protection. 
The last chapter provides a summary and a comparison of the different legal systems. Furthermore 
it contains a conclusion with the key points of this research as well as a recommendation for an 
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improved insolvency procedure taking into account the advantageous aspects of each of the 





Chapter Six Comparison of the Different Legal Systems 
Legislation can have a significant impact on changes in social structures. This can also lead to 
unforeseeable changes. For example, the intention of the South African legislator was to prevent 
excessive interests by introducing the Usury Act. At the same time, however, this law led to the 
emergence of an informal financial sector.  
Conversely, legislation often has to address changes in social structures. The introduction of 
consumer protection, for example, can be attributed to the increasing number of consumer debtors 
worldwide, which forced legislators to react. Meanwhile, many countries have realised the need to 
introduce a special insolvency procedure for people with low incomes. Despite these developments, 
however, the number of over-indebted consumers continues to rise. This chapter will first give a 
summary of the legislation regarding consumer insolvency in Great Britain, New Zealand, Germany 
and South Africa. Second, a comparison of the different systems is provided. The last part presents 
a recommendation for insolvency proceedings combining the most favourable aspects of the legal 
systems described in this research is presented. 
 
I. Summary of the Different Legal Systems 
In the United Kingdom there are five different procedures, namely Bankruptcy, Individual 
Voluntary Agreement, County Court Administration Order, DRO and Debt Management 
Arrangement. With its five different procedures, Great Britain has the most possibilities within the 
legal systems mentioned and is quite liberal with the possibility of a DRO every six years as 
compared to New Zealand and South Africa where debt relief is a once in a lifetime opportunity. 
Nevertheless, the average debt per household continues to rise and peeked to £15,400 per household 
in early 2019, whereas it ‘only’ amounted to around £10.00 per household, when the DRO was 
introduced in 2006.550  
 Similar to British insolvency law, New Zealand insolvency law has four different 
procedures: Bankruptcy, Proposal, Summary Instalment Order and NAP. While Bankruptcy 
establishes a minimum debt of NZD 1000, the other three procedures do not. The proposal requires 
the consent of creditors and is therefore unsuitable for low-income debtors. The Summary 
Instalment Order, on the other hand is a simplified, and therefore a cost-effective alternative to the 
Bankruptcy. It is a debt restructuring measure, which protects the debtor against the debtors’ 
attempts to enforce their claims outside the procedure, but doesn’t provide for debt relief.551 Finally, 
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the NAP offers an alternative to Bankruptcy and provides access to debt relief for debtors without 
assets whose debts are between NZD 1000 and 47000 and who pass the prescribed means test.  
 Germany, on the other hand, only has one insolvency procedure which is only available to 
debtors who have sufficient assets to bear the costs of the proceedings. If this is not the case, the 
application for insolvency is dismissed due to lack of assets. This has the advantage that the debtor 
is not subject to the restrictions which the insolvency proceedings entail. However, the debtor does 
not enjoy the advantages of successful insolvency proceedings, such as debt relief and prohibition 
of individual enforcement. 
 South African insolvency law is predominantly creditor friendly and does not principally 
aim to relieve the debtor of her debts. There are four different procedures in force: Firstly, there is 
sequestration, which requires enforceable assets and an advantage for creditors and is therefore only 
suitable for wealthy debtors. After ten years, the debtor is discharged of all her debts and thus 
enabled to have a fresh start. Second, there is the Administration Order for debtors whose debts are 
R50 000 or less. The aim of this procedure is to restructure the debt in order to achieve debt 
reduction. The disadvantage of this procedure is that it does not provide for debt relief and due to its 
high costs only causes more debts to the debtor. The third procedure is the debt review, another debt 
restructuring measure which, similar to the administration order, is not very helpful for the debtor. 
Finally, the Debt Intervention Procedure was recently introduced, which provides for debt relief for 
debtors with little or no income. Fourthly, the Debt Intervention Procedure has been in force since 
August 2019, which is now also providing debt relief for low-income debtors. 
 In summary, the insolvency systems in South Africa, New Zealand and Great Britain are 
similar in that they have several procedures with different requirements, whereas in Germany there 
is only one insolvency procedure. The advantage of different procedures is that they cover a wider 
range of insolvency scenarios, whereas a single procedure offers less flexibility. For instance, there 
is no special procedure in Germany for people on low incomes. Thus, there is no possibility of debt 
relief for those debtors who do not meet the criteria for insolvency. The disadvantage of many 
different procedures, however, is that the insolvency system can easily become incomprehensible 
for a non-lawyer. Furthermore, South Africa is faced with the problem that the Administration 
Order and the Debt Review are practically ineffective and exacerbate the debtor’s precarious 
situation due to their high costs. The introduction of debt relief for people with low incomes 
through the National Credit Amendment Act in South Africa was an important step towards 
equality since it provides debt relief for people on low income. However, it remains to be seen 







As can be seen in the preceding chapters, the legislations in the different countries deal differently 
with the issue of low income insolvency. What they have in common is that the rights of creditors 
and debtors need to be restricted in order to reach a compromise. However, the extent of the 
restrictions varies depending on whether the protection of creditors or debtors is the primary 
concern in the country in question. 
 A striking difference between the different legal systems is that South Africa, New Zealand 
and Great Britain have many different insolvency procedures, while there is only one in Germany. 
However, this means that in Germany there is no alternative remedy available to those debtors who 
do not meet the requirements of this procedure. Sequestration in South Africa, Bankruptcy in New 
Zealand and Great Britain and insolvency proceedings in Germany are comparable procedures. 
What they have in common is that the debtor's assets are enforced and the proceeds of the auction 
of the property are paid out to the creditors. After a certain period of time in which the debtor tries 
to pay off the remaining debts, the debtor is granted debt relief and thus a fresh start. However, 
repayment periods vary considerably from country to country. In Great Britain, for example, a new 
start is granted after two to three years and in New Zealand after three years. By contrast, debtors in 
Germany have to wait six years for debt relief and in South Africa 10 years.  
 To a certain extent, the IVA in Great Britain and the proposal in New Zealand are 
comparable. Both procedures involve negotiations with the creditors to enable the debtor to repay 
her debts, for example by reducing credit rates or interests. Both procedures, however, have the 
decisive disadvantage that the creditors' consent is required for an effective conclusion to be 
reached.  
 Furthermore, Debt Review and Administration Order in South Africa are comparable to the 
Summary Instalment Order in New Zealand and the DMA in Great Britain. These procedures are 
similar in that they are essentially debt restructuring measures. Differences exist primarily in costs 
and effectiveness. Both administration order and the debt review are not suitable for reducing the 
debtor's liabilities due to their high costs. On the contrary, in many cases they even cause an 
increase in the debtor's financial distress. The Summary Instalment Order, on the other hand, is 
comparatively inexpensive, as only a one-time fee of NZD 100 has to be paid. Therefore, this 
procedure is likely to help the debtor to achieve the desired debt relief. The DMA has the explicit 
requirement of a regular income of the debtor and in return enables her to retain her property. This 






 Finally, in South Africa, New Zealand and Great Britain there is an insolvency procedure for 
low income debtors. These procedures have in common that they should give low-income debtors 
access to debt relief. In addition, the debt may not exceed a certain amount, which varies from 
country to country. Despite the common purpose, there are some differences: The DRO in Great 
Britain is open to the debtor if her liabilities do not exceed £15,000, her assets do not exceed £300 
and the value of her car does not exceed £1000. The debtor receives a debt discharge after one year. 
British DROs are unique in that an application for DRO is possible every six years. In contrast, the 
NAP in New Zealand and the Debt Intervention in South Africa are unique opportunities. In order 
to be admitted to the NAP, the debtor must not have any realisable assets. In addition, the debtor 
must not be adjudicated bankrupt or declared bankrupt. Unlike Great Britain and South Africa, there 
is no strict income or asset limit in New Zealand. Instead the debtor must pass the prescribed means 
test. This test takes into account not only the debtor's own income but also that of relatives living in 
the same household. Debt relief in New Zealand also takes place after one year. The debtor's debt 
must be in the range of NZD 1000 to 47,000. The South African debt intervention is for debtors 
whose debt does not exceed R50 000 and who either have no income or whose income does not 
exceed R7 500. Unlike NAPs and DROs, debt relief is not automatically granted to every debtor 
after one year. Rather, there are two options, depending on the possibilities of the debtor. Under the 
first option, the debtor's debts are restructured and she must seek to repay her debt over a period of 
five years or more. If her income is not sufficient for a restructuring, the second option allows the 
debt to be suspended for 12 months with the possibility of extending this period. An evaluation 
takes place after eight months. If the evaluation reveals that repaying the debts is not possible for 
the debtor, there is a possibility to have the debts written off. A special feature of the newly 
introduced debt intervention procedure is that it requires its participants to attend a financial literacy 
program. The legislator has thus clearly recognised that many debtors lack the knowledge about the 
responsible management of money. The South African legislator has thus taken up the criticism of 
the participants of the New Zealand NAP. 
 
III. Recommendation  
Looking at the different approaches of the legal systems outlined above, it becomes apparent that 
they each have certain advantages and disadvantages. The knowledge gained can be used to design 
a new insolvency procedure that combines the advantages of these systems. An insolvency 
procedure containing advantageous features of the different insolvency systems might look as 
follows: After the debtor has filed for insolvency, her financial situation is evaluated. If her assets 





on a pro rata basis. After a good conduct period of 5 years, in which the debtor makes monthly 
payments to the creditors to pay off her debts, the debtor is granted debt relief and thus a fresh start. 
If the debtor’s assets are not sufficient, debt restructuring and a reduction in interest rates must first 
be attempted, and the debtor must try to repay the debt. After 3 years the debtor’s progress will be 
evaluated. If it is found to be impossible for the debtor to repay her debt, a debt discharge takes 
place. This procedure is supported by compulsory participation in a financial literacy program. 
Furthermore, there should be an alternative procedure comparable to the British Debt Management 
Arrangement, which doesn’t require the surrender of the debtor’s asset and allows the debtor to 
retain her property, for example a house, on the condition of regular payment. Furthermore, each 
debtor should attend compulsory financial literacy training. The increasing number of consumer 
debtors worldwide is also an indicator that many people lack knowledge about the responsible use 
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